

Consensus and Legitimacy

Social Control Mechanisms in Contemporary China

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A critical analysis of the social control mechanisms used by the Chinese Communist Party to manipulate the opinions of Chinese citizens, employees of the State, and Communist Party members. The intended outcome is to generate popular consent for the continued rule of the Chinese Communist Party and to maintain social and political stability. In effect this engineers party legitimacy.

Acknowledgements

I would like to thank *everyone* that helped me to finish this research paper, and for their patience while I drifted in and out of reclusive behaviour. First and foremost, I would like to thank Dr. Wong Yiu Chung, my thesis mentor, for helping me to develop this topic into a working paper. The frequent afternoons in your office chatting about politics and current events were much appreciated. Your patience and good humour made writing this an enjoyable experience. Although I cannot mention all the names of those I interviewed, I would like to extend my gratitude for being given the time to ask questions and seek guidance, even when the discussion would drift off-topic. Especially to Dr. Willy Wo-Lap Lam and Cardinal Joseph Zen Ze-kiun, who names I *can* mention. I sincerely hope that this paper doesn't get either of you into any trouble and that it lives up to your expectations. I would like to thank Dr. Zhang Baohui for his persistent support in my academic career and for his personal interest in my future success. I would also like to thank Anuja Shah for her patient and comprehensive editing advice. This paper is (hopefully) error free as a result of her assiduous efforts. As well, thanks for caffeine. Thank you to Aqua Kang Shuchang for your help translating Chinese texts, I *literally* could not have done that without your help, and thank you for patient debates about domestic politics in China, always insightful. Thanks to Elaine Yam Chiu-ling for providing me with the technological equipment to conduct my interviews and for convincing me that I should write an acknowledgement section. Thank you to the esteemed Dr. Chris 'Von Batarang' Korvela and the eminent Kristjan Sigurdson for intellectual guidance. And special Thanks to my family, for their love and support.

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Topic

The aim of this thesis will be to present a critical analysis of how the Central Government of the Peoples Republic of China, as represented by the Chinese Communist Party (CCP), uses mechanisms of social control to manipulate the opinions of those both inside and outside of the party. The intended outcome of social control is to generate popular consent for the continued rule of the CCP and maintain social stability within China.

The history of China is clearly extensive, with roughly 3760 years of recorded history, beginning with the ancient Shang Dynasty. Throughout this timeline, China's rulers have shared a similar characteristic in that they have each held firmly entrenched positions of power. Whether looking at the historical legacies of dynastic inheritance, divine right, charismatic appeal or simply military superiority, the various governing bodies of China have occupied relatively safe positions of power, thanks in part to occupying positions of legitimacy as perceived by the masses. Historically speaking, the government bodies have often possessed complex infrastructure and logistics networks, in order to project significant influence over the nation. To challenge such entities is an extremely difficult undertaking, as any popular resistance to such authority is often shorthanded by disparities in the people's capacity to effectively organize themselves in large numbers or across vast distances.

Contemporary China, the Peoples Republic of China, under the authority of the Chinese Communist Party was initially supported through ideological appeal during a tumultuous period of its history, where different political and military groups each vied for rule of the country. The tenets of the Communist Party held popular charm for those who felt disenfranchised under the Kuomintang/Nationalist Party during the Republic of China era (1912 – 1949), the regional military

cliques of competing warlords (1916 – 1927), the Imperial Japanese occupation forces as well as its Manchukuo puppet state (1931 – 1945), and the final remnants of the Qing dynasty (1644 – 1912).

Since its rise to power, the central ideologies and their inherent values have changed dramatically. The CCP has moved from a classic Leninist revolutionary organization into a self-styled ruling political party, the self-declared ‘Socialism with Chinese Characteristics’, blending market capitalism with state owned enterprises, Confucian values of harmonious social networks and homogeneous nationalism (with the Han ethnic group representing the dominant majority), all phrased within the context of a vanguard socialist party. Yet, even with these fundamental changes in the guiding ideological characteristics espoused by the government, the CCP has been very successful in maintaining control over the public, thanks largely to having cultivated favourable opinions in the masses and controlling the access to information (especially information that might be contrary to promoting CCP-rule). Sustained influence over public opinion has continued to be made possible via the embrace of new technologies and forms of communication, utilized for the broadcasting of government agenda. By understanding the rapid evolution of telecommunications and information technologies, the CCP has kept up to pace with the means of selectively controlling the distribution of information.

With the constant reforms to its foundation as a socialist government, the CCP still occupies a position of legitimacy; the single-party system is largely unquestioned and unchallenged. As the organization and objectives of the CCP have changed since its dominance in 1949, the nature and strategies of thought work have changed as well. I will be exploring the period from 1989 until present with special attention given to the current state of affairs within the country under the fourth-generation leader Hu Jintao. China has undergone significant shifts within the CCP under the leadership generations of Deng Xiaoping, Jiang Zemin and Hu Jintao, with each possessing different characteristics. Tensions between the people and the government reached a relative climax culminating on June 4th

1989 with the 'Tiananmen Incident'. In seeking to resolve this event and safeguard against future scenarios of unrest, the CCP enacted new measures of censorship and oversight to control the flow of information alongside political education that coincided with the economic reforms begun in 1978. The turmoil of 1989 set a precedent for the continuous enhancement of CCP superintendence over the media, a relationship that continues today. Continued public support in favour of the CCP and the relative stability provided under its governance has been achieved partially through state control of information. This paper seeks to explore the social control mechanisms, the strategies and tools used, as well as the institutionalized means of ensuring CCP influence.

Hypothesis

The Chinese Communist Party, through its various organs, utilizes specific mechanisms of social control in an attempt to cultivate public opinion that supports continued party rule, and that a stable and productive society serves to legitimize this popular consent. Relative social stability in contemporary China is the product of social control mechanisms, if social controls were to cease than Chinese society would fracture. Propaganda, censorship, state-run education, thought work, and a judiciary subjected exclusively to the party will are tools to popularize the legitimacy of the Chinese party-state, which in effect further consolidates control over the country and its people. I describe the means used by the CCP as mechanisms of social control.

The attempts to achieve social control are not necessarily malicious in nature; the CCP is actively dedicated to improving the lives of its citizens and social control is a constituent part of this process, which, if successful, has reciprocal benefits for the CCP. Broad censorship and monitoring over the flow of information may appear inherently wrong, especially to those raised in the absence of such controls, it violates certain instincts of human freedom. Yet, I believe that in the case of China, these controls are

simply the CCP's means of ensuring the formation of a harmonious society, albeit one in which the Communist Party has absolute control and unchallenged authority.

Objectives

In order to validate my hypothesis during the course of this thesis, I seek to gather and present information that will answer these three principal questions:

What are the specific mechanisms of social control currently in use?

What are the effects on society when applying social control mechanisms?

Why is social control actively used by the CCP?

The investigation into these three questions will serve to verify my hypothesis by determining the importance of social control, what form and in what settings do social control mechanisms operate, and whether such control mechanisms are successful in achieving the party objective of popular consent and perceptions of legitimacy. These three questions share a correlation on understanding the social, economic, cultural and political environment currently found in China. The answers to these questions will also offer insight into the historical relationship between the party, the state, and the masses, while hopefully developing a rough model to predict future trends in this relationship.

In order to answer these questions and illuminate the correlations between them (in effect, validating my hypothesis), this thesis is divided into six different Chapters. This Chapter, "Social Control: An Introduction" serves as an introduction to the thesis; to state the topic and objectives of this research, how the intended research will be undertaken, and what key points are important in understanding the questions at hand. Chapter 2, "Party & State" is intended to provide a cursory understanding of the Chinese Communist Party, the People's Republic of China, and some of the current

issues that affect the party-state system and its relationship to Chinese citizens. Chapter 3, “Evolution in the CCP” explores the transitions undergone within the CCP, such as ideological and organization changes, and how this process of evolution has altered the nature of China’s one-party system and the social control mechanisms necessary to sustain it. Chapter 4, “Controlling the People’s Republic of China” describes the institutions that administer social control and some of the constituent parts of this bureaucracy, as well, detailing key groups targeted by social control – and finally the specific mechanisms used by the CCP to garner social control. Chapter 5, “Prospects for the Future” will summarize the findings of this research, some additional key points in understanding CCP legitimacy, and present future implications and the conclusions reached. Throughout these five chapters, it will be necessary to refer back to original interviews and research literature, described in the next subsection.

Methodology: Interviews and Conceptualizations

To support my research and case examples, I will be using four interviews to serve as primary sources, supported by additional literature as the secondary materials.

The interviewees have little in common outside of their experiences and knowledge of social control mechanisms in the People’s Republic of China. These individuals come from very different backgrounds in terms of education, employment, and social outlook. Likewise, those interviewed possess vastly different opinions and levels of support for the CCP; each having been raised in different political climates (an important characteristic to consider, as the CCP under Mao, Deng, Jiang and currently Hu are characteristically different). Under each leadership, the relationship and “normal” interactions between the CCP and the masses have changed, reflective of the different party ideologies through each successive generation of paramount leaders. Hopefully, combining the information

provided by such different individuals will approach a more “complete” perspective by which to understand the nature of social control and its importance to the CCP.

Given the potential sensitivity of the topic covered in this thesis, the names and official titles of the first two interviewees cannot be included, as per their requests for anonymity at the time of the interview. For simplicity, these individuals will be referred to by the number corresponding to the order in which they were interviewed.

Interview One¹

The first interviewee is a cadre for the Chinese Communist Party and formerly served as a university spokesperson for the CCP. Born and raised on the affluent East coast of China following the economic reforms under Deng Xiaoping, she received much of her advanced education from top-tier Chinese Universities and has been lucky enough to receive some international education in Western countries. She is a firm believer in the vanguard nature of the party (though as a government serving the masses first and foremost rather than as a revolutionary force premised on Marxist-Leninist ideology). Her interest in the party was fostered at a young age, through Communist youth organizations, such as the Young Pioneers in primary school and the Communist Youth League in Secondary school. Her awareness of social control mechanisms stems from experiences abroad and in the current international business environment, which provided the opportunity to compare the political environment and lifestyles between China and other developed countries.

Interview Two²

The second interviewee is a high-ranking Western diplomat who has served in China for over twenty years in various governmental roles. He was among one of the first “waves” of foreigners to enter China – Beijing specifically – following economic reform and the opening up of the country. With a career in international politics, he has had extensive formal and informal relations with the CCP,

including regular access to party elite. His experiences within China include the Tiananmen Square Incident of 1989, where he witnessed the action taken against student-protestors firsthand. As well, given his line of work, the interviewee has a considerable understanding of the mechanisms of social control used by the CCP, both in the practical applications of party control and for the necessity of ensuring legitimacy.

Interview Three³

The third interviewee is Dr. Willy Wo-Lap Lam, a Hong Kong-based China specialist with more than 25 years of experience analyzing and writing about Chinese politics, foreign and military affairs, and China-Taiwan relations. Currently, Dr. Lam is the Adjunct Professor of China Studies at Akita International University, Japan, and the Chinese University of Hong Kong, and also a Senior Fellow at The Jamestown Foundation, a think tank which studies global events of strategic importance to the United States. His past experiences include serving as a Beijing correspondent until the Tiananmen Incident in 1989, and in senior editorial positions for Asiaweek, South China Morning Post, and the Asia-Pacific Office of CNN. With extensive experience studying China from an academic position and as an investigate journalist, Dr. Lam is aware of the social controls and strategies currently utilized by the CCP. During his experiences in Beijing leading up to the June 4th Incident, he was persistently under surveillance by the CCP and to this day most of his work concerning China is censored.

Interview Four⁴

The fourth interviewee is (the recently retired) His Eminence, Joseph Zen Ze-kiun, Cardinal of the Roman Catholic Diocese of Hong Kong. Born in Shanghai and educated during the Second Sino-Japanese War, Cardinal Zen fled to Hong Kong while still a student in order to escape from Communist forces, following their victory in the Chinese Civil War. Cardinal Zen was the Provincial Superior (covering Hong Kong, Macau, Taiwan and China) for the Roman Catholic Order, the Selesians, a charity which

provides spiritual and corporal work and education for those entering into priesthood. Zen returned to China in September 1989, teaching theology and philosophy for seven years at the various Seminary schools which had been acknowledged by the CCP. Cardinal Zen has longstanding antipathy for the CCP, and is known for publicly expressing his views on the protection of human rights, including political and religious liberty. He has extensive experience with the control mechanisms utilized by the CCP, as during his tenure within Chinese Seminaries, but also from relations with Chinese Catholics, members of the ordained hierarchy and devout citizens, both of whom remain under the authority and regulation of the state-sponsored Chinese Catholic Patriotic Association.

Before beginning to investigate this topic in earnest, it is important to provide definitions of the key terms that will be used throughout the process of this investigation.

Social Control Mechanisms

In the most elementary form, social control mechanisms are the means by which behavioural patterns are regulated. These can be distinguished between “Soft” and “Hard” controls. Soft social control mechanisms are ideological in nature, altering the way individuals think. An example of a soft social control would be control over the flow of information, attempting to predetermine what individuals can know. Hard social control mechanisms are coercive in nature, forcing individuals, or threatening the use of force, in order to elicit a desired response. An example of a hard social control would be the use of riot police, forcing individuals to comply in the face of violence or legalistic punishments. Social control mechanisms are by no means limited to the PRC or authoritarian states in general, but in the PRC soft social controls are very pervasive and backed by hard controls. This thesis is primarily concerned with the soft control mechanisms because popular consent and legitimacy of the CCP cannot be generated long-term through persistent coercion.

Social control may further be distinguished between being proactive or reactive. A proactive mechanism of social control would be to curb the tendencies or perceptions of individuals towards an intended result. Censorship can serve as a proactive means of social control, serving to prevent the anticipated results that might occur if such precautions were not otherwise undertaken. For example, justifiable opinions against the continued rule of the CCP exist, but by censoring these opinions, the CCP can prevent these opinions from entering into public awareness, to do otherwise may invite popular discontent. Reactive means of social control may take the form of punishments. Legal enforcements would be an example; in failing to adhere to prescribed laws (which may induce social control); an individual could be subjected to imprisonment as a consequence, which additionally serves as a warning to others.

Thought Work

The term “thought work” is derived from the Chinese term “*xuānchuán yǔ sīxiǎng gōngzuò*” (宣传与思想工作), which literally translates into “propaganda and ideological work”. Of course, there are deeper meanings to this expression, as many words in Chinese have different implications depending on the context. For example, “*gōngzuò*” also carries the meaning “construction”. Semantics aside, thought work is the process by which propaganda and ideology are individualized, how the symbols (and interpretation of these symbols) within ones’ individual environment are constructed. Of course, the manner of accomplishing this, and the success of such activity may differ greatly. While the historically, thought work was targeted towards party and state cadres at lower levels in small study session in order to correctly understand the policies related to the party-line, but in contemporary China, thought work can broadly denote over all aspects of society, but with less importance attached for those outside the party or state infrastructure.⁵ Thought work has coercive as well as persuasive aspects, distinguished between the use of soft or hard social controls.

Propaganda

In Chinese, the word for “propaganda” is “*xuānchuán*” (宣传), but bearing in mind alternative context-dependant definitions, more recent translations might choose the alternate meaning “publicity” which is a more neutral term, lacking some of the negative connotations that “propaganda” may otherwise imply. The importance of this distinction will be covered later. The Merriam-Webster dictionary defines “Propaganda” as “The spreading of ideas, information, or rumour for the purpose of helping or injuring an institution, a cause, or a person,”⁶ while according to political scientist Harold D. Lasswell; “*Propaganda in the broadest sense is the technique of influencing human action by the manipulation of representations.*”⁷ For the purposes of this thesis, it is important to note that the relative “ideas/information/rumours” may be modified or entirely fictitious, “the manipulation of representations”. Additionally, the “technique of influencing human action” is perhaps equally important to the technique of influencing human *inaction*.

Censor

Specifically, the definition of the transitive verb “to censor” and drawing upon Merriam-Webster once more as a resource; “to examine in order to suppress or delete anything considered objectionable.”⁸ As such, further clarification of the definition “to censor” requires a distinction to be made between objectionable material and not objectionable. This of course is a moral judgement, an assessment of right and wrong. Therefore, it is important to understand *why* material is deemed objectionable rather than *what* is being suppressed or deleted.

Nationalism

The term “Nationalism” refers to “loyalty and devotion to a nation; especially: a sense of national consciousness exalting one nation above all others and placing primary emphasis on promotion of its culture and interests as opposed to those of other nations or supranational groups”⁹ While this is

remains an apt definition, it contains a somewhat negative connotation in perceiving ones' respective nation above others, as this denotes superiority. Perceptions of superiority can serve to justify selfish interests over the interests of those deemed inferior.

Legitimacy

More specifically, political or social legitimacy needs to be defined. The material of this thesis examines aspects of the relationship between a party-state and the citizens (represented or contained) within the sovereign borders; the "locus" of legitimacy is the masses. In other words, how Chinese citizens regard legitimacy of the party-state. For example, "Legitimacy" (vis-à-vis the quality or state of being legitimate) may be defined as "accordant with law or with established legal forms and requirements"¹⁰ but this assumes that laws or legal forms are recognized and adhered to by the individuals within the respective system. As such, the state of being "legitimate" requires recognition on behalf of the masses in accordance to their expectations; legitimacy cannot simply be "created" by laws.

Ideology

While an "ideology" constitutes "a manner or the content of thinking characteristic of an individual, group, or culture" and "the integrated assertions, theories and aims that constitute a socio-political program"¹¹ it is important to reflect upon how the "manner of thinking" or "the integrated assertions, theories and aims" impact individual human action. Ideology can serve as a moral guideline, used to assess or justifying what is right and wrong. In this manner, what is deemed right/wrong is dependent upon what the ideology prescribes. Alternatively, ideology can be used as a filter for understanding the world, allocating what is important, necessary, valuable, just, or alternatively, what is trivial, worthless, and unjust.

Literary Review

Research on this topic requires considerable reading into topics of contemporary Chinese politics, history of China and the Chinese Communist Party, Communism as a theory (crossing social, economic and political dimensions), mass communication theory, propaganda, censorship, nationalism, social unrest, concepts of legitimacy, the Constitution of the People's Republic of China, and economic reform. Four specific sources merit literary review because of the similarity between the ideas presented in these respective works and those being examined in this thesis.

*China's Communist Party: Atrophy and Adaptation*¹²

Written by David Shambaugh; an expert on Chinese politics and foreign policy. A former advisor for both the National Security Council and the State Department for the United States government, he currently works as senior fellow at the Center for Northeast Asian Policy Studies. This book examines the simultaneous processes of how the Chinese Communist Party's decline in the "traditional instruments of control – propaganda, coercion, and organization,"¹³ and the subsequent consolidations of power through reform. Shambaugh accesses this to be "a constant cycle of reform-readjust-reform-readjust,"¹⁴ of the CCP organization and ideology in order to extend longevity as the ruling body within China.

The themes presented in this book serve as useful research material for the investigation in this thesis. Firstly, by examining the pattern of relative decline and corresponding reforms to the mechanisms of control utilized by the CCP, it presents the continuing importance of such control. If such control mechanisms were no longer integral to the continued rule of the CCP, then logically, they would be permitted to atrophy into non-existence. This also presents how the control mechanisms used by the CCP can be continually applied to contemporary society. Furthermore, by examining the organizational fluctuations of atrophy and adaptation, it is possible to see the how the party has changed since its inception while still retaining authority.

This ideas contained in this book as well as the principal data collected by Shambaugh will be used to support the Chapter 3 subsections: “Ideological Evolution of the CCP”, “Evolution of the Party-State”, and “Evolution of the Need for Social Control”. The first subsection of Chapter 3, “Ideological Evolution of the CCP” coincides well with Shambaugh’s Chapter “Rebuilding the Party: The Ideological Dimension,” as it serves to explain the different transitions of party-line ideology throughout the successive generations of Chinese leadership, while also exploring the correlations between Chinese economic modernization and ideological reforms. Similarly, the subsection “Evolution of the Party-State” shares similar themes with Shambaugh’s chapter “Rebuilding the Party: The Organizational Dimension,” in exploring how the CCP has remodelled itself from a revolutionary vanguard into a political party and how this has altered the relationship between the CCP and the PRC. Finally, “Evolution of the Need for Social Control” relates to the general picture described throughout *China’s Communist Party: Atrophy and Adaptation* as social control remains a foundation of continued CCP authority as indicated by the mechanisms of social control both inside and outside the party being reformed alongside the party itself.

*Chinese Politics in the Hu Jintao Era: New Leaders, New Challenges*¹⁵

Written by the same Dr. Willy Wo-Lap Lam from Interview Three, his book investigates the current, fourth-generation, CCP leaders such as President Hu Jintao and Premier Wen Jiabao. In the course of this investigation, Dr. Lam assesses the distinctions between the generational cohorts; the similarities, differences, problems to be faced (and those already being dealt with), the processes of reform, as well as the changing relationships between the party, the state, and the people.

An important theme explored in this book is the idea that the party seeks to “attain the age-old goal of indefinitely extending the CCP’s ruling-party mandate,”¹⁶ essentially locating “the formula that will enable the CCP to remain a “perennial ruling party”.”¹⁷ According to Dr. Lam, the CCP seeks to

improve decision-making power, reduce the disparity between rich and poor, improving social welfare, enhancing the quality of state/party cadres, continued modernization, and long-term (and environmentally sustainable) economic growth. All of these programs serve to ameliorate Chinese society, but also improve the CCP's image as the legitimate government of China. Of course, it bears mention that democratic reforms are not considered a part of these social reforms, as the CCP is intent on remaining in power. In the absence of a stabilized society, Dr. Lam also provides case examples of social control and the crackdowns implemented against social unrest. His observations support the hypothesis that a stable and productive society is complementary for generating consent for the party-rule, and his examples serve as evidence for the continued application of social control mechanisms.

Drawing from Dr. Lam's material, his second Chapter, "The Crisis of Legitimacy: Hu Jintao's Search for a Perennial Mandate of Heaven," will be used to support my subsections "Evolution of the Party-State" and "Evolution of the Need for Social Control" in Chapter 3, as his material contains a sober dissection of how the CCP is building a platform of legitimate rule, rather than resting on the laurels of revolutionary Marxist-ideology. Additionally, Dr. Lam's Chapter, "The Scourge of Governmental Stagnation: The Price of Holding Up Political Reform," contains examples and analyses of public dissidence and the subsequent responses on behalf of the CCP to manage these events, examples which are directly relevant to my Chapter 5 subsection, "The Mechanisms of Social Control".

*Marketing Dictatorships: Propaganda and Thought Work in Contemporary China*¹⁸

Dr. Anne-Marie Brady, professor of political science and communications at the University of Canterbury is a research specialist on Chinese domestic politics, international relations, and nationalism. She previously headed the Royal Society of New Zealand's research team on the topic of China's propaganda system and its role in maintaining the one-party state in China.

In her book, Dr. Brady explores the junctures at which the party influences public opinion and “maps” the bureaucratic network of propaganda and thought work within China. One of her key themes is how the propaganda and thought work have served to “repackage” the image of the CCP, downplaying Marxism-Leninism in favour of nationalism and selective anti-foreignism. It is her observation that “the party must focus its energy (and base its legitimacy) on both economic growth *and* a renewed emphasis on propaganda and political thought work.”¹⁹ This theme correlates well with the hypothesis of this thesis and provides useful insight into the technical specifics of *how* social control is applied within Chinese society. Dr. Brady’s work also provides insight into the CCP’s inner workings, as during the course of her research she acquired copies of internal reports, “*nèibù tōngxùn*” (内部通讯), data which I might have otherwise been unable to collect.

In adapting Dr. Brady’s material to the thesis, her Chapters, “Guiding Hand: The Role of the Propaganda System,” and “China’s Unseen Engineers: Reform and Modernization in the Propaganda System,” provide explanations that support the subsection “Evolution of the Need for Social Control,” in my Chapter 3. Likewise, Dr. Brady’s work, more specifically, her Chapter on “Regimenting the Public Mind: The Methods of Control in the Propaganda System,” is a source of invaluable information for expanding upon the other constituent research displayed in the Chapter 5 subsections, “Institutions of Thought Work and Propaganda” and “The Mechanisms of Social Control.”

*The Fog of Censorship: Media Control in China*²⁰

He Qinglian is currently working as a senior researcher in residence at the non-governmental organization, Human Rights in China. Previous to this, she worked in the Propaganda Department of the municipal Communist Party Committee in Shenzhen and as a writer and editor for the Shenzhen publication *Legal Daily*.

Her book is an in-depth analysis of the how the CCP censors media, detailing all major forms of mass media and the different technological, legislative, and administrative tools used to ensure that censorship is unobstructed. Drawing from personal experiences in China as well as some of the actions carried out during her employment in the Shenzhen office of the CCP Propaganda Department, the topics covered in her book are supported by a vast array of internal reports and legislation concerned with maintaining censorship over all forms of media. Throughout this book, He expresses a recurring sentiment: that the CCP uses censorship for the intention of keeping Chinese citizens ignorant, premised on the logic that ignorant individuals are easier to rule than those who are intelligent and informed. While trying to avoid harsh criticisms of the CCP, as this thesis intends to present an objective evaluation (rather than subjective opinion), He's opinion relates to further considerations in the aforementioned hypothesis, namely, *what are the effects in applying social control mechanisms?*

Using He's collection of legal documentation, internal CCP communiqués, and research greatly complements the other resources in use for this thesis. He's Chapters, "Government Control of the Chinese Media," "Internal (*neibu*) Documents and the Secrecy System," and "The Hijacked Potential of China's Internet," are each very useful in bolstering the subsections of Chapter 5, "Institutions of Thought Work and Propaganda" and "The Mechanisms of Social Control" by providing extensive evidence and novel insight.

In seeking to understand *how* and *why* the Chinese Communist Party utilizes mechanisms of social control to manipulate the perspectives of the Chinese population, it is necessary to briefly explain the structure of the Chinese Communist Party and the State itself. As social, cultural and political conditioning can align the masses with the state agenda, the process by which this agenda is formulated deserves an explanation. It is equally important to present the structure of the party and the state, and the way in which these two organizations are interconnected, in order to understand the means by which power over the country is achieved. China's party-state structure faces serious problems to maintain legitimacy which may potentially undermine the ability to effectively lead the country. It is therefore important to understand these issues as well as how the rectification of these issues could potentially enhance the mechanisms of social control, or similarly, how social control mechanisms can elicit possible solutions.

Structure of the People's Republic of China

The domestic and foreign policies put forward by the People's Republic of China are often interconnected with the dominant ideology held by the Chinese Communist Party. Under Chairman Mao, "the Great Helmsman", policy was legitimized on the ideological grounds linked to class struggle and socialist revolution. Yet in contemporary China, in order to instigate reforms which no longer adhere to Marxist-Leninist principles, it is necessary to reform the "official" party-line ideology in order to legitimize (and in some cases rationalize) the necessary changes for achieving modernization. This will be covered in greater detail in the next Chapter.

The key decision-makers forming the political elite of the Chinese government possess a high degree of freedom to guide national development, lacking some of the checks and balances found in other government models.²¹ Often, the leadership in China - currently the Presidential position – can intertwine their personal edicts with the party ideology, further developing the ideas that constitute Chinese socialism. Three of the most contemporary ideologies within the PRC will be detailed as well, including “Deng Xiaoping Theory” (邓小平理论) by Deng Xiaoping, the “Three Represents” (三个代表) of Jiang Zemin and the “Scientific Development Concept” (科学发展观) of Hu Jintao. These have each had significant effects on reforming the party and the country as a whole. The executive organs of state control, the legitimacy of the CCP, and the nature of support for the continued authority of the CCP as the official party of the PRC are largely dependent on how the party line is adopted, as will be explained later.

The CCP is the sole political party with governing authority in the People’s Republic of China, dominating the executive, legislative, and judicial roles within the country. This status is ensured by maintaining a monopoly on legitimate political organization utilizing Leninist organizational principles²² that prohibit the formation of groups which would challenge the authority of the CCP.²³ Beijing serves as the central authority of the Chinese state, otherwise known as the Central People’s Government. Eight non-Communist parties also exist within the PRC, albeit only after having received the prior approval of the CCP.¹ Although these additional parties do not constitute opposition parties, they act as participants for the discussion and administration of state affairs.²⁴ These political parties still remain under de facto control of the CCP as election into the National People’s Congress is subject to CCP

¹ These parties are the Revolutionary Committee of the Kuomintang (中国国民党革命委员会), China Democratic League (中国民主同盟), China Democratic National Construction Association (中国民主建国会), China Zhi Gong Party (中国致公党), Taiwan Democratic Self-Government League (台湾民主自治同盟), China Association for Promoting Democracy (中国民主促进会), September 3rd Society (九三学社), and the Chinese Peasants' and Workers' Democratic Party (中国农工民主党).

authorization. At any point in time, the CCP maintains the right and authority to disband or forcefully abolish any of these political parties. There should be no illusion that the PRC operates as a one-party system.

The National People's Congress (NPC), with no more than 3,000 seats, forms the highest legislative body of the People's Republic of China with annual plenary sessions held in Beijing.²⁵ There remain five further sub-divisions between the central and local levels. Beneath the NPC in Beijing are the people's congresses of provinces, autonomous regions and municipalities. City congresses are then divided into respective districts while counties and townships form the lowest tier. Each level serves to elect the delegates of the subsequently higher tier; for example, NPC delegates – the national/federal level – would be elected by candidates from provincial-level congresses.²⁶ The NPC will therefore be composed of the senior delegates from throughout China, as well as deputies from the military serving as delegates, elected amongst the armed forces of the People's Liberation Army (PLA). Though referred to as a "democratic" process, this tiered system is regulated by the CCP at each level to ensure party approval of representing delegates as such: "...Party members are subordinate to the Party organization, the minority is subordinate to the majority, the lower Party organizations are subordinate to the higher Party organizations, and all the constituent organizations and members of the Party are subordinate to the National Congress and the Central Committee of the Party."²⁷ This organizational structure is referred to as democratic centralism, characteristic of Leninist political parties.

The principal duties of the NPC are to enact laws and to make amendments to the Chinese constitutions when deemed necessary. As the ideological platform of the CCP government has regularly changed since its founding on October 1st 1949, the constitution has been consistently updated in order to reflect the evolution of social, economic, and ideological platforms. Four major versions have been published since the principal version of 1954. Second and third drafts were developed in 1975 and 1978,

at the beginning and the end of the Cultural Revolution, while the fourth (1982) constitution is the version still in use today, though it contains major revisions, following amendment in 1988, 1993, 1999, 2004, and 2009, reflecting the changes in party leadership and Chinese society. As the highest legislative authority, the NPC also selects and appoints the leadership in the central organs of state power. The highest of these positions are the President and the Vice President of the Central government, but which also include other top officials such as the members of the Standing Committee, Ministerial heads, the Governor of the People's Bank of China, the President of the Supreme People's Court, the Procurator-General of the Supreme People's Procuratorate and the Chairman of the Central Military Commission. Such broad control over political appointments (*nomenklatura*) and the legislative process allows the NPC to influence the process of social and economic policy implementation within the country. Yet, even with this broad range of power, the principles of democratic centralism can limit the role of the NPC to ratifying the decisions already made by the State Council.

The National People's Congress Standing Committee (NPCSC), which consists of about 150 members, serves to create and modify legislation between the annual plenary sessions. The Chairman of the Standing Committee (Wu Bangguo, at the time of this writing) is effectively ranked third in terms of formal power within the State hierarchy. The legislative authority of the NPCSC provides oversight into the enforcement and interpretation of the Constitution. At the same time, all laws or administrative regulations under the Central political organs including the State Council, the Supreme People's Court, Supreme People's Procuratorate, and the Central Military Commission are under review of the NPCSC. Constitutional and legal interpretation is considered to be a legislative activity rather than judicial process in China. For example, this grants the Standing Committee the ability to decide whether to ratify or abolish foreign treaties as well as to determine the legal rights of Chinese citizens.

Originally referred to as Chairman but re-titled as “President” following the 1982 constitution (currently held by Hu Jintao; previously, Jiang Zemin) is the paramount leader of the PRC, holding the top positions of both state and party power within the country. As President, one also fulfils the additional offices of General Secretary of the Communist Party and Chairman of the Central Military Commission, although these roles are decided upon and voted upon by the NPC. As General Secretary of the Communist Party, Hu Jintao is the highest-ranking party leader and serves as the head of the Politburo Standing Committee. The Chairman of the State Central Military Commission is the head of the Central Military Commission and acts as the country’s military Commander-in-Chief. These three titles grant control over the three political branches of China – the PRC, the Chinese Communist Party, and the People’s Liberation army – consolidating the administrative power held by the office of President. This trinity of powerful positions also serves as a disambiguation of leadership title amongst the government, clarifying the union between the CCP and the state and the role of the PLA as an army of the Party. Responsible for the organization and administration of China’s civil bureaucracy, the Prime Minister (currently Wen Jiabao) supports the Chinese Presidency. The Premier also serves as the Chairman of the State Council, the highest executive administrative authority in the PRC.


The State Council, usually composed of 50 members, contains the executive leadership of each constituent ministry, department, commission and offices that form the Chinese state. Although the majority of these individuals are Party members, non-Party members have increasingly been appointed in recent years based on their educational or technical expertise, despite their lack of formal political allegiances. The State Council is responsible for carrying out the principles and policies of the CCP as well as the regulations and laws adopted by the NPC.²⁸

Within the State Council is the Ministry of National Defence, although this organ does not officially command authority over the Peoples Liberation Army (PLA). The Ministry of National Defence

serves as liaison for the Central Military Commission and PLA when working with foreign militaries, for example, in joint-military exercises or international peacekeeping operations.²⁹ The Central Military Commission (CMC) is itself the policy making body of the military, and is organizationally divided between two different commission titles: the Central Military Commission of the People's Republic of China and the Central Military Commission of the Communist Party. While the Central Military Commission of the People's Republic of China is a state entity supervised by the NPC, the Central Military Commission of the Communist Party is the real organizational head and commanding body of the PLA. Each of these commissions shares identical personnel and institutional designs, thereby fulfilling the interlocking characteristics of the Chinese government between Party and State. Given its control over China's army, navy, air force, and paramilitary police, the CMC is a powerful entity within Chinese politics, especially considering the roles played by China's previous revolutionary and military leaders, Chairmen Mao Zedong and Deng Xiaoping, respectively.

While legislative power is held by the NPC and its Standing Committee, the State Council and its respective Standing Committee are responsible for executing and enacting administrative laws. Led by the Premier and his appointed vice-premiers, secretary-general, and councillors of state, the Standing Committee of the State Council exercises much of the day-to-day decision-making authority, as without their approval, laws will not be put into complete effect. Vice-premiers and councillors are often allocated the responsibility for the work of one specific sectors or a set of issues facing the country. The vice-premier or councillors maintain the contact with the related ministry or commission of the State Council which implements the policy specific to their assigned areas. This division of responsibility permits the Standing Committee of the State Council to manage the major bureaucratic entities of the state.

Figure 2.1: State Organization



Structure of the Chinese Communist Party

Within the PRC, the Party *is* the State; the two entities are nearly indistinguishable from each other. During Interview Two, the interviewee described the party and state as the same thing, only considered separate when it is convenient for the CCP to do so, “*the only differences that exist in reality are those that are needed; to keep the Chinese party off the hook in certain key issues, [to] provide manoeuvrability, a cut-out.*”³⁰

Through control over all state apparatuses and the legislative process, the CCP forms the absolute political authority in the PRC. With a registered base of over 70 million Communist Party members, the CCP forms the largest single political organization in the world, constituting roughly 5.3% of China’s total population.³¹ Similar to the NPC, the Party National Congress (PNC) is the highest decision making bodies of the CCP. Its role is to discuss and decide the major issues for Party development and to revise the constitution of the Party. Additionally, it is the duty of the PNC to elect the 300 members of the Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party. Adhering to this hierarchy,

the Central Committee elects the next stage of Party leadership, the Politburo, its Standing Committee and the General Secretary of the CCP.

Also referred to as the Political Bureau of the CCP Central Committee, the Politburo is a group of about 19 to 25 officials responsible for oversight of the CCP. Their power is further manifested within the CCP as Politburo members generally hold high positions in other state or party organs and therefore have control over respective personnel appointments. Similar to the NPC, the Politburo also has a Standing Committee of about 5 to 9 members, and although the procedures of their closed-session meetings are held in secrecy, this group is composed of the highest state and party leaders in the country. Its current members include the ranks of President Hu Jintao (also the General Secretary of the Central Committee and Chairman of both Party and State Military Commission), Premier Wen Jiabao, Chairman of the Standing Committee of the National People's Congress, Wu Bangguo, and the Chairman of the People's Political Consultative Conference, Jia Qinglin.


A secretariat operates with the duty of overseeing the preparation of items and topics for the consideration of the Politburo meetings, and must subsequently ensure these policies are implemented and all resulting decisions become operational instructions for the subordinate bureaucracies.

As previously detailed, the Central Military Commission of the CCP is nearly identical to the CMC of the PRC in terms of membership and organizational structure. This is the direct organizational link between the PLA and the CCP, highlighting the military role as a party organ rather than that of the PRC. This connection is easily recognized given the role of the PLA in the Chinese Civil War and the subsequent founding of the PRC. Mao Zedong, in the iconic "Little Red Book" (毛主席语录) is quoted as saying "Political power grows out the barrel of a gun."³² As an army of the party, the CCP controls one of the largest military forces in the world – an important part of their international and domestic power. Another important paramilitary force is the People's Armed Police (PAP), which is tasked with policing,

internal security, and civil defence. However, it is important to note that under the dual authority of the CMC-CCP and the State Council, the PAP is not considered a part of the PLA. As the military is important for CCP power, so is the title of Chairman of the Central Military Commission of CCP for individual power, as evidenced by both Deng and Jiang maintaining this post as the last role to be abdicated before retirement from their formal political careers.

The Central Commission for Discipline Inspection (CCDI) of the Chinese Communist Party is responsible for the supervision of party members and organizations. While under the leadership of the Central Committee, the CCDI may investigate party members of any rank. In addition to enforcing anti-corruption measures, the CCDI also reviews potential ideological heterodoxy to ensure that party members adhere to the party line, both in opinion and in action. For example, on March 3rd, 2009, the CCDI met in Beijing to urge all party members to embrace the current party ideology, the Scientific Development Concept, into their daily lives. "...[to] *match their thoughts and behaviours with the central government's policies on promoting the scientific development.*"³³ Amongst other party organs, this commission helps to maintain relative solidarity in CCP, an important duty amidst the internal issues facing the party.

Figure 2.2: Party Organization



Contemporary Issues within the CCP and the PRC

While the official role of the party has remained largely unchanged since its founding, seeking to serve the people as a Communist vanguard organization, China *itself* has changed since the inception of the CCP, albeit as a direct result of government policies and initiatives. In the past 88 years, China has seen the end of dynastic Imperial rule, experienced civil war and hostile military occupation, undergone industrialization, economic reform and liberalization, opened itself to international political engagement, reunited with Hong Kong and Macau, and is presently experiencing unprecedented economic growth and development. Accordingly, the CCP has evolved as well; its leadership, organizational hierarchy, membership criteria, objectives, institutions, and means of governance in the PRC have changed to coincide with or precede the development of the country. As this evolution progresses, numerous internal problems have surfaced in the CCP. These issues directly affect the relationships between the party, the state, and the people.


Organizational structure of the State and the Party remains complex and extremely bureaucratic, although considerable efforts have been made to render the government more efficient and effective. In January 2005, as part of a “Party’s Governing Capacity” program the Central Committee endorsed a campaign seeking to “maintain the advanced nature of CCP members” during the Fifth Plenum of the Sixteenth Party Congress.³⁴ This was to be effected by strengthening the party committees at all levels, rooting out corruption and laxity amongst party and state cadres, improving inner-party democracy, while educating party members about Leninism & Marxism and reviewing the writings of Mao Zedong, Deng Xiaoping, Jiang Zemin and Hu Jintao. The endeavour had characteristics of the old-style rectification campaign, similar to those held during the Cultural Revolution (1966-1969) designed to interrogate party members, forcing them to make lengthy self-criticisms and then punishing

or expelling those found to be inadequate.³⁵ After 18 months of studying, self-criticism and peer-criticism, 70.8 million party members as well as 3.5 million grassroots organizational members had participated. The result was the creation of 130,000 new party organizations and the 'rectification' of 156,000 weak party organizations. As well, 44,738 party members were expelled, having failed to meet party expectations.³⁶

In an effort to improve governing ability and the competence amongst those in the party, state, and military sectors, midcareer training has served an increasingly important role through the use of a party school program. The party school system achieves two objectives: improving the education of PRC cadres and also maintaining party control over these individuals. Here, cadre members study Marxist-Leninist ideology as well as the recent party doctrines (Mao Zedong Thought, Deng Xiaoping Theory, Theory of Three Represents, Scientific Development Concept), methods of organizational control (administration, management, leadership science), and broader university programmes (BA's, MA's, and PhD's).³⁷ The highest facet of this school system is the Central Party School in Beijing. Here, the party elite are trained and in recent years this institution has served as platform for the international education of party members with foreign lecturers and exchange programmes offered to the enrolled party members. This has provided an opportunity for party members to hone their skills in international affairs and foreign relations. The party schools have also served as a think-tank for party policy and consensus formation, as the student population consists of the current and emerging party leaders.³⁸ Through CCP-managed matriculation, the party can steadily maintain better-educated party members while also ensuring that the running ideology is understood and appreciated. This platform also serves as a means of socializing party/state officials into newly developed ideological dimensions, a means of ensuring support for policy implementation and development.

Corruption, patronage, and factionalism have posed considerable problems within the CCP, harming the solidarity and public image of the party. Party membership yields access to certain preferential treatment and influential social networks; since economic reform, party membership has become increasingly seen as a way to earn money. With control over state enterprises and government budgets under the authority of individual party members, and little regulation on financial transparency, government officials have been able to personally benefit from state coffers. For example, in September 2006, Chen Liangyu, party chief of Shanghai and Politburo member was investigated and subsequently indicted with corruption, abuse of power, protecting those violating party discipline, and furthering the interests of his family.³⁹ Auditors determined that under Chen, ¥ 4.8 billion had been illegally transferred out of Shanghai's social security fund and redirected towards the private business interests of colleagues, friends, and family; this was in addition to ¥2.39 million which Chen accepted in bribes. Sentenced to 18 years in prison, amongst other colleagues also charged in connection, his case represented the corruption present within the highest tiers of government. Perhaps more importantly, Chen is the highest-ranking official to be stripped of power and sentenced for such conduct in over a decade.⁴⁰

Figure 2.3: Simplified Model of CCP Organizational Pyramid



Source: LaPalombra, Joseph L. Politics within Nations. Upper Saddle River: Prentice Hall, 1974. 527. Modified and originally cited in Wang, James C. F. Contemporary Chinese Politics An Introduction (7th Edition). 7th ed. Upper Saddle River: Prentice Hall, 2001. 70.

In an effort to remove corrupt elements within the party, the Central Discipline Inspection Commission (CCDI) of the Central Committee is responsible for investigation and supervision. With majority of the Chinese population living in rural communities, local officials are the tangible connection to the Central Government and the local implementation of Beijing's policies. Corruption, or rather the opportunity for corruption, displays the imbalance of power between members and non-members; as affiliation to the party opens influential social networks. The CCP is expected to be the facilitator of economic development and the provider of social welfare, security and justice, but party members are well-positioned to abuse power. The corruption problem is directly related to the political relationship between the party and the state. Party refusal to empower non-party institutions or objective 3rd party watchdogs, combined with a lack of judiciary independence from the party, has resulted in corruption becoming a systemic problem. Corrupt officials represent the weaknesses in the state institutions; in response, these corrupt elements are fined, removed from office, imprisoned, and punished by means up to and including execution.⁴¹ During the interview with the former party spokesperson, it was expressed that activity of the CCDI is of utmost importance to the CCP; *"to solve and clean the party... because we have lost our faith already... If these things [corruption] are going on, then the party will destroy itself."*⁴²

While the Party and state each have relatively defined organizational structures, the chain of command within the Party often operates along informal networks, outside the defined hierarchy. This is one of the products of democratic centralism, while democratically the system should operate as

bottom-up, informal networks of power and influence are top-down (see Fig 2.3). An example of this was seen during the Tiananmen Square incident of 1989. During this tumultuous political crisis, which culminated with the June 4th military action against protestors, the highest executive position in the Party was held by Zhao Ziyang as the General Secretary of the Communist Party Central Committee. However, it was Deng Xiaoping who was recognized as the de-facto paramount leader, especially in the resulting aftermath. While Deng's official title during the period was 'Chairman of the Central Military Commission of CCP', his dual title of Chairman of the Central Military Commission of the People's Republic of China provided him the authority to command the army. Combined with an influential network garnered over his (then) 66 years as a Party member, Deng overshadowed Zhao's power. While Deng supported economic reform and gradual privatization, Zhao was an advocate of reforming the party itself, separating the party from the state and thereby improving transparency. Ultimately, the power mobilized by Deng and other party elders purged Zhao and his supporters from the party, consequently stabilizing party authority under the dominant force of Deng Xiaoping.

Nepotism has been difficult issue to address within the Party as well as the business community in the PRC, as such relationships are partially integrated into Chinese culture. The concepts and activities involved in a system of patronage are especially apparent when understood under the Chinese terms of "Guānxi" (关系). Although there exists no direct English translation, *guānxi* describes a connection between individuals in which one is expected to provide a favour or service to another, or inversely is expected to be the recipient of such a favour. It may also describe a social network of such connections, as one might possess certain individual relationships that serve to facilitate his/her objectives. These favours may be intangible services, such as advice or consultations, but they may be also tangible goods such as jobs, products or services.⁴³ As a relative norm in Chinese society, these patron-client interactions are common in both the political and business realms. The *guānxi* exchanges may be embodied in instances of corruption, favouritism, discrimination and the inefficiencies wrought by

cronyism. These social networks may serve to weaken political hierarchies, with those appointed along terms of *guānxi* rather than individual expertise, experience or merit. What's worse is that these social relationships are self-generating; the exchanges involved lead to its entrenchment in the Chinese political system. Without an effective legal system to ensure transparency, there are no means by which to ensure a fair system in which rules must be followed. For these reasons, citizens may doubt their government officials, as members of the government use their political influences to their own advantage rather than relying on fair competition. By breaking formalized rule of law and informal conventions of fairness, these individuals illegitimate their political positions in the eyes of the public by circumventing the laws that govern fair business practice.⁴⁴ A by-product of patronage and the *guānxi* system is factionalism within the party. Given the informal nature of power held by Chinese leaders, factionalism is drawn along lines of state/party hierarchy as well as the evolving ideological foundations which define each succession of Chinese leadership.

As the *guānxi* generates patron-client relationships (whereby loyalty to individuals is self-serving rather than in pursuit of the greater good) this promotes the creation of different political factions. Factionalism here refers to when party members or state officials operate in a contentious manner, seeking to promote their self-interests, or the interests of his/her affiliate network. This is especially evident during the major transitional periods within the party, when the leadership of the state and the CCP reorganized. Different factions will compete to appoint their allies amongst the top echelons of the party, while it's also common for those already in the highest positions to designate successors in order to maintain valuable *guānxi* connections. While the PRC operates in a single-party system, state decisions and policies may be based on loyalty to one's patron. Loyalty (or perhaps implied subservience) may arise from the subordinate relationships created by democratic centralism. Factional ties may also be linked to individual backgrounds such as networks developed during college, vocational

training, training and re-education at party schools, civil service postings, the cliques formed amongst leaders' assistants and protégés, and the "princeling" networks of the party elites' children.⁴⁵

Factionalism has also evolved between the different generational cohorts of leadership within Chinese politics, quite literally. Within all stages of promotion in the Communist Party, age and seniority (often indistinct from one another) are criteria for subsequent tiers of promotion, while certain ages entail mandatory requirements. In turn, these different generations reflect evolving social or cultural values based on the era of political development the individuals were raised in. This leads to the formation of power blocs within the party, as different political cliques are formed out of individuals' relative era of membership or their *guānxi* networks. For example, China has undergone four generations of leadership within the party, each with its own distinct ideologies and motivations on how best to govern the country. The first generation is composed of the senior party members who founded the PRC, revolutionaries who led communist forces during the Chinese civil war. These individuals are largely influenced by the ideologies of class-struggle embodied in the work of Marx & Engels, Lenin and Chairman Mao Zedong in their pursuit of establishing a classless society.⁴⁶ The second generation are those who were junior members during the revolution but comparably moderate in their socialist ideologies. This generation's ideology, as espoused by its paramount leader General Secretary of the CCP, Deng Xiaoping, is characterized by the pragmatic economic reforms and liberalization during the late 1970s and early 1980s under "Deng Xiaoping Theory". The third generation came to maturity after the communist revolution once the PRC and CCP was firmly established. As such, this generation of leadership lacks revolutionary/military backgrounds that are characteristic of the first two generations. This also marks a shift in the party organization and membership, described under former President Jiang Zemin's "Theory of Three Represents"⁴⁷.

The current (fourth generation) party leadership is characterized by members who rose during China's current economic boom, inheriting a rapidly developing country, though this also comprises the "Cultural Revolution generation". In addition to being substantially younger than the previous Central Committee members, they are also the best educated in CCP history. Ninety-nine percent of the 16th Central Committee had university-level education, compared to the 23 percent of the entirety of CCP members.⁴⁸ The core ideology and objective of this generation is President Hu Jintao's "Scientific Development Concept". The differences between these different generations in turn create a very challenging political system, especially for newly emerging leaders, as they need to contend with the incumbent leadership of the previous generation, and in turn contend with the incumbent ideology and established policy structure amongst the political elders. Transitions of power can bring out intra-party rivalry, as different factions each seek to install their own allies.

Conclusion

Although the PRC state is interlocked with the CCP, it serves as an important distinction for understanding the relationship between the party and the people. The party maintains the position that it is for the people, seeking to serve their interests; therefore, the state infrastructure is the channel through which these interests are addressed. While in many ways the distinction may appear superfluous, it serves to reinforce the one-party system. The PRC constitution – the basic principles and laws governing the nation – explicitly define the country as socialist.

"The People's Republic of China is a socialist state under the people's democratic dictatorship led by the working class and based on the alliance of workers and peasants. The socialist system is the basic system of the People's Republic of China. Sabotage of the socialist system by any organization or individual is prohibited."

Source: Article 1, Constitution of the People's Republic of China, adopted December 4th 1982

In the absence of another socialist vanguard party, the CCP is legally ensured to be the only political organization with the right to govern the PRC. However, the founding ideologies, (or rather belief in the founding ideologies) cannot be counted upon to safeguard the perception of CCP legitimacy. Furthermore, as long as the government isn't directly elected by the people, the CCP requires additional means of maintaining continued public support or, inversely, a lack of public opposition. It is in this regard that mechanisms of social control are essential.

Social control is important for the CCP both inside and outside the organization, for Chinese citizens and party members alike. Social control may help deal with some of the issues facing the party such as factionalism, corruption, and nepotism. In failing to socialize against these issues, legal repercussions, such as imprisonment or execution, and political repercussions, such as member purges are the present means of dealing with these problems. Punishment is not a solution, but it remains a reactionary measure; they can serve as a deterrent but are consequences after the fact. In contrast, when mechanisms of social control are applied to CCP members, this can ideally socialize them to acceptable codes of conduct. Rather than attempting to satisfy their own desires, whether they are power or wealth, social control can be utilized to reinforce the original intention of serving the people. Social control when applied to citizens may be necessary to create a positive public image of the CCP and its policies, to generate public opinion, to create awareness of issues facing China (or interpretations of issues), to foster nationalism, and to mitigate social unrest. Chapter 3 will explain why social control is used in China, how the means of social control has changed during the evolution of the CCP, and why social control is still important to the CCP.

Chapter 3 will explore some of the major changes and development undergone by the CCP. By no means is the party a stagnate entity; it has consistently reformed in order to remain in power. The

evolution of the party will be briefly detailed as these changes have impacted the means by which social control is achieved.

With an understanding of the organizational structure of both the PRC and the CCP existing in a conjoined relationship, one can appreciate the degree of control that can be exerted upon the ordinary lives of Chinese citizens. The influence of the CCP is manifested in all aspects of life, whether under direct control of party members, or subtly guided by domestic policies; the social, cultural, economic, religious, and political arenas are determined by CCP decisions. In order to retain the one-party system as the legitimate government for the people, the CCP is forced to address their own problems. It is unlikely that the CCP would be able to govern the country if they were not able to govern themselves.

This chapter analyses how the relationship between the CCP and the people has evolved, it is a relationship that has been continually renewed in order to remain contemporary amidst the changes experienced since the passing of Chairman Mao.

Ideological Evolution of the CCP

With the revolutionary history of the CCP as a Marxist-Leninist party; ideology played an important role in justifying the governance over China. A proletarian revolution had resulted with the formation of the PRC, with the party largely composed of peasants, workers and soldiers led by a group of revolutionary intellectuals, representing majority of the Chinese population (and supposedly in their best interest). With economic reform and liberalization, many of the founding characteristics of a proletarian society have disappeared. The former egalitarian organizational principals of society have given way to a renewed bourgeoisie-proletarian dynamic, but alongside massive poverty alleviation and overall improvements in the lives of ordinary Chinese citizens. This has required an ideological evolution, both for explaining the evolving role of the party as well as to justify continued CCP rule.

While a guiding ideology is important to maintaining solidarity within the party and providing a perspective that justifies party rule for citizens; a devout belief in CCP ideology safeguards against the spread of dissident beliefs that might challenge continued party rule. For example, the spread of religion threatens the party monopoly on what is to be classified as morally right or wrong, especially poignant considering that the CCP is officially atheistic. Cardinal Zen's personal experiences testify to the importance of controlling religion, in his case, the Catholic Church. During his early teaching experience in Chinese seminaries, his lessons were constantly recorded and attended by party officials to ensure that his religious teachings did not compromise party values or incite discord with party rule. In another example, Cardinal Zen explained how his Hong Kong teachings are currently censored in China because of his efforts to promote religious freedom.⁴⁹

The late 1970's marked the beginning of what is commonly referred to as "the reform era", one of the most drastic overhauls of the Chinese political and economic system since the founding of the PRC, this also marked one of the first dramatic overhauls of party ideology. It is important to note that when describing ideological evolution, at no point is the rule of the party under dispute; while the CCP has included addendums to the founding Marxist-Leninist principles, it continues to be a vanguard party based on democratic centralism. Likewise, each generation of leadership devoutly believes in the necessity of the CCP as the legitimate party for the PRC. The reform era began the first large-scale transition into alternate ideologies from those put forward while under Chairman Mao. This is important both internally and externally, serving to maintain stability and unity within the party (such as reducing opportunities for factionalism) as well as to redefine the relationship between the CCP and the people.

Under the leadership of Deng Xiaoping, the country began the rapid economic growth and social development that characterizes contemporary China. Deng opened the country to the global economy and international relations, but in so doing also challenged the status-quo of Marxist-egalitarian social

order. With a pragmatic approach to policy development, Deng sought comprehensive modernization with development based on observable progress, minimizing the importance of eliminating bourgeoisie elements and the emphasis of class struggle.⁵⁰ Deng's "Practice Is the Sole Criterion of Truth" campaign of 1978 marked an important transition for the ideological underpinnings of CCP policy formulation. In effect, this campaign changed ideology into an inductive means of validating empirical evidence, rather than deriving policy from ideological principals. Deng sought to "*Seek truth from facts, and make the practice the sole criterion of truth,*" his addendum to the former Maoist dictum. While the role of ideology has remained an important aspect of CCP rule, it became a tool for post-hoc rationalization of party and state policies rather than the exclusive origin-point.⁵¹ This is an important contribution from Deng Xiaoping as the "Practice Is the Sole Criterion of Truth" legitimized the possibility of reforms that might lack Marxist, Leninist, and Maoist underpinnings.

Deng sought to modernize four key areas: the agricultural sector, industry, science and national defence, stressing marketization, diversification of the economy, and opening up to the international arena as a means to achieve growth. This required a careful blend between a market economy and the existing socialist organizations. Because of which, the introduction of capitalist market forces and consumerism were in direct conflict with some of the Marxist-Leninist principles which had been emphasized during the previous 30 years under Mao's leadership. While economic reform brought newfound wealth into the hands of citizens and party members alike, it ended widespread egalitarianism. Ideological reform marked a departure from the moral compass of "Mao Zedong Thought" for which to guide the actions and decisions of party members.⁵² Prior to the reform era, self-sacrifice and duty to the Chinese people was the integral duty of the CCP, and while this is not entirely absent in contemporary party-thought "to get rich is glorious" became a common slogan, to quote Deng. One might argue that this reform has led to the contemporary obsession with acquiring wealth, an interest which has extended to party members, but manifested in corruption.⁵³ The merit of "Deng

Xiaoping Theory” is most clearly recognizable in the modernization achieved in China. For example, the success seen in the Special Economic Zones (SEZs) of Shenzhen, Hainan, and Xiamen serve as testament to Deng’s economic reforms, initially premised on ideological reform.⁵⁴ Economic reform has to date greatly improved the living standards of Chinese citizens, with poverty being reduced from 33% of the population in 1990 to less than 10% in 2004.⁵⁵

With shifts in the core ideology and state/party hierarchy, the party has changed its membership composition accordingly. Originally, the ideal party members were of the “revolutionary classes”, peasants, workers, and soldiers, but with economic reform and modernization, the party has itself reformed; consistent with the changing nature of contemporary Chinese society. This policy shift was officially embodied in ideology in during the 16th Party Congress in 2002 (although first introduced spring 2000) in former President Jiang Zemin’s theory of “Three Represents” (subsequently adopted into the Chinese constitution to stand amongst the theories of Marx, Lenin, Mao, and Deng). Following some of the alterations to Marxist philosophy initiated by Deng, party membership was shifted to reflect the changing socio-economic environment,

“...In a word, the Party must always represent the requirements of the development of China's advanced productive forces, the orientation of the development of China's advanced culture, and the fundamental interests of the overwhelming majority of the people in China...”

Source: Jiang Zemin’s political report at the 16th CCP Congress, 2002

With this, Jiang sought to integrate the industry managers, entrepreneurs and intellectuals, the “advanced productive forces” of the new economy. This organizational change served to benefit the party in two distinct ways. Firstly, it served to improve the overall “quality” of party members. The admission of better educated members from professional and intellectual backgrounds serves to improve CCP policy-making while also recognizes the forces of globalization at work in China’s economy, integrating the new elite of private enterprise into the party ranks.⁵⁶ Secondly, this served the party by

enhancing its connection to the new productive forces of society, the individuals leading the current economic expansion.⁵⁷ However by changing the membership composition of the CCP, ideological divisions appeared.

Jiang's theory increased the diversity of the party and in so doing increased the diversity of those represented by the party, but this also alienated the traditional supporters of the CCP. In recognizing those who would have been called "bourgeoisie capitalists" in Mao's era, the Theory of Three Represents Theory effectively ended revolutionary class struggle. During Interview One, the interviewee explained this transition as a "confusion" of the values, what it means to be a part of the CCP; *"Gradually we get a little bit confused ourselves. We don't know if we join the Party because we want to or if because it is easier to get a job... The old principles for old party members don't fit anymore," "Now things have changed a lot, we have different values. The government tries to put up new things [ideal values] for the young people because the old stories won't work anymore."*⁵⁸ While Jiang's theory is in direct conflict with traditional Marxist-and Maoist-views of revolutionary classes, much to the ire of the more conservative factions within the CCP, it maintains the vanguard role; a reflecting the interests of the people.⁵⁹ As mentioned during the interview, the reforms under Deng and Jiang have changed what it means to be a part of the party, which is after all, a Communist party. As a result, the recent generations of party members require additional thought work, in order to contend with the contradictions present in Chinese society.

The most recent and current ideology put forward by acting President Hu Jintao as the guiding CCP doctrine is the theory of "Scientific Development Concept". It encompasses a set of policies designed to improve the growth of the national economy, universalize compulsory education and social security, improve the quality of life for citizens, stabilize prices against inflation, improve legal institutions, and realize a harmonious socialist society. This has marked an important shift from the

predominantly economic principles pursued in recent history and contains largely humanistic precepts, although economic development still serves the interests of improving the quality of life enjoyed by Chinese citizens. This also marks an attempt to address the growing disparity between the affluent classes; the elite and newly formed middle-class, and those left behind in post-reform era; the rural poor peasant class, migrant workers and unemployed urban populations. Disparity has become a serious problem in China, potentially leading to extensive social fragmentation between the different classes. As an indication of how large inequality is, a recently published report by the United Nations Development Programme indicates that the Chinese GINI coefficient is amongst the highest in the world at 0.469.⁶⁰ President Hu Jintao has phrased the attainment of a harmonious society within the rubric of the “Scientific Development Concept”, bearing similarities to Lenin’s *Utopian and Scientific Socialism* whereby proper social planning and engineering might lead to the democratic, egalitarian, and “scientific” development of society.⁶¹

Outlined during his speech at the Central Party School for provincial and ministerial level cadres in June, 2007, the Scientific Development Concept aims to further develop the lives of ordinary Chinese citizens, state infrastructure, the economy, and the party. Hu’s approach consists of implementation of programmes and policies to accelerate “socialist modernization”. In developing the economy, Hu’s policies seek to strengthen the agricultural sector, recognizing its importance to national security, the conservation of natural resources, levelling the competition between private and state-owned firms, deepening financial sector reforms, and instituting macroeconomic regulatory control systems. The development of social institutions for the benefit of the Chinese citizens, such as improving access to education (both advanced education and mandatory education programs), expansion of employment networks, improvement to the means of income distribution, establishing basic social security programmes covering urban and rural residents, and providing public healthcare for all citizens. This

theory also seeks to close the gulf between the wealthy eastern provinces and the relatively poor western that have been largely neglected in receiving the same benefits of modernization.⁶²

Additionally, Hu's theory bears elements of Confucianism by seeking to achieve "harmony", but specifically the traditional ideas of the Confucian scholar Mencius. During the third interview, Dr. Lam pointed out an interesting observation comparing Confucian philosophy, Hu Jintao's theory, and the CCP control over society: *"The idea of harmonious society comes from Confucius and Mencius, at least those aspects which can gel with what the party is doing. For example, there is one branch of Confucianism, what you might call "adulterated", the Confucianism that doesn't encourage people to make rebellion. In the minds of the public; you should obey your rulers, don't make trouble and be happy with your station in life. Do not challenge your superiors, and respect the officials. On the other hand, officials should care for their constituents as children."*⁶³ The Scientific Development Concept stresses a lot of these ideas, but phrased differently, such as "strengthening inter-party discipline" and "democratic centralism". The continued campaign against corruption and improving the means of prevention, supervision, and punishment of corrupt party members, would seek to promote benevolence cadres.⁶⁴

The pursuit of Scientific Development would continue the evolution of the CCP, updating how the party interacts with Chinese citizens and therefore ensuring an avenue for continued support as the PRC's legitimate political party, rather than being regarded strictly as an authoritarian regime.

Evolution of the CCP

The ideological transformations within the CCP have led to changes in the role of the party. The party has increasingly become likened to a political party-in-power rather than as a revolutionary force. For example, historically, the CCP members under Mao were recruited heavily from military backgrounds, often consisting of those who had served as guerrilla soldiers during the civil war.

Following the During the Cultural Revolution, only workers, peasants, or lower-middle peasants were eligible to be CCP members.⁶⁵ Of course these recruitment measures led to a vastly under-educated party membership, unfit for governing a large and populous country seeking to modernize. In contrast, the Three Represents Campaign allowed for diversification amongst members while improving the educational and technical qualifications of government officials. This reform also allowed for representation of the emerging social classes within the party without the need for democratic process. The fourth generation, characterized by leaders such as Hu Jintao and Wen Jiabao, potentially represent a new trend within the CCP. Coming from non-revolutionary backgrounds, the fourth generation has greater technocratic experience and higher education than previous generations. These new elites may provide an improvement to the governing capacity within the country while also opening up senior positions in the PRC to non-party members based on technical expertise rather than party loyalty.

In lacking reforms towards democratization, the state will require improvements to the bureaucratic efficiency within the existing authoritarian model, improving the CCP rather than reforming the status-quo of one-party rule. Larger states require more revenue for self-sustenance, and as a result corruption in state/party officials has been used to supplement low wages. Any constriction of local government budgets may result in additional taxes being levied against the rural communities.⁶⁶ Streamlining the bureaucratic process is likely to be met with resistance, especially among lower level officials who lack the influential political and business networks to ensure future financial security. Alternative means are thus required to eliminate redundant state employees and governing party officials so that the size of the state can be reduced without risking the social fragmentation that might be incurred if these individuals become predatory upon the population to ensure their continued financial security. For example, rectification campaigns have served to remove unnecessary individuals and positions while also ensuring that ideological “right thinking” is employed by officials. Input mechanisms have also served to connect the public needs to the large bureaucratic hierarchy of the

PRC, a system which may otherwise risk disconnection with an awareness of local conditions and any ability to respond effectively and in a timely fashion. An example of this would be village-level elections, which have served to integrate rural communities with the local government, thereby enhancing legitimacy of the proximate organs of the party-state.⁶⁷

Ruling by law may serve as the means to ensure good governance in the PRC, the aim being to socialize “morally right” relationships in accordance with a Socially Harmonious Society. This would include the relationships between party members; improving intra-party democracy and reducing factionalism, relationships between the party and the people; improving capacities of governance, and the relationships between common citizens; improving social cohesion along legalized conduct. Rule by law would serve as a quasi-infrastructure for checks and balances against abuses of power as it would grant avenues for legal action against those in violation of the law. For example, citizens have been granted limited power to help ensure party officials adhere to anti-corruption laws, on December 18th, 2007 the PRC launched the website for the National Bureau of Corruption Prevention of China (NBCP)⁶⁸, a website where individuals can anonymously submit reports of corruption in party officials. In mid-2004, the Office for Adjudication and Inspecting Laws and Regulations (OAILR) was established to inspect potential violations of the Constitution in government departments. However, the OAILR lacks the power to challenge executive organs. While ruling by law may create an incentive for party officials to conduct their affairs according to law, or risk lawsuits, it is more likely that ruling by law will empower the CCP further by providing legalistic precedent for their actions and decisions.

It is important to note that CCP rule *by* law should not be confused with Western legal concepts describing the rule *of* law. During Interview Two, the interviewee perceives the law as simply another tool for control; “the whole problem I think with the Rule of Law in China, what [the] Chinese Communists mean by that, is rule *by* law. The law is a cut out, a tool to be used to bring about the will of

the party.”⁶⁹ While the CCP governs according to Chinese Constitution, this legal document is under the authority of the party to be amended, which is further dependent upon whatever party-line has been established by the incumbent paramount leadership. Therefore, applying administrative principals according to the constitution is more accurately the application of principals according to the party elite. As Hu Jintao commented on December 2002 “*We must uphold the basic strategy of ruling the country according to law...we must further raise the entire society’s consciousness regarding the Constitution as well as the authority of the Constitution.*”⁷⁰ Given the lack of judicial independence within the PRC; the laws remain a tool of ensuring party control. The courts are heavily politicized as the appointment of personnel falls under the nomenclature system of the CCP, falling short of the ideal role as providers of justice and unbiased adjudication.

This regime legitimacy of the CCP has also undergone fundamental changes in the past three decades, transformed from ruling by right of revolutionary ideology into a political party achieving modernization. With the gradual economic reforms following 1978, monetary incentives have replaced ideological motivations. The CCP is increasingly relied upon to provide the Chinese population with a stable economic environment and continued growth. Legitimacy has become increasingly interconnected with performance, the ability to ensure job security and improvements to social welfare, especially following the decline of state owned enterprises and the “Iron Rice Bowl” of guaranteed socialist-egalitarian provisions. Although never officially stated by the government, the CCP is responsible for maintaining the positive growth that would continue to improve the livelihood of Chinese citizens.⁷¹ Domestic and foreign policies will therefore seek to support and encourage this stability, but only insofar as it allows the CCP to maintain control and authority over the country.⁷² Additionally, patriotism serves to legitimize the party. For example, by uniting the country around important national events, such as the Beijing Olympics or the launching of the Shenzhou VII rocket, these events can be interpreted, and are indeed marketed, as distinctly *Chinese* accomplishments.

During the third interview, when asked to describe the locus of CCP legitimacy, Dr. Lam drew a similar assessment; *“There is no more revolutionary legitimacy, only economic performance. This is linked with a mandate of heaven... Sometimes they emphasize the achievements of the CCP, but sometimes depending on the audience they don’t mention the CCP, only the revival of Chinese glory, so that they can rope-in people that might not like the CCP, but nonetheless it is the CCP that has made everything possible... Even if you don’t like them, there is nobody else.”*⁷³ Yet, the absence of any serious competition for rule over China does not incur laxity in controls by the CCP; rather, the controls have been modernized.

Evolution of the Need for Social Control

As the party-state has changed evolved; so has the need for social control and political stability. Ideological evolution and reform has changed the nature of the CCP as a vanguard party as well as what Chinese expect from the regime. Economic reform and the gradual “opening” of the country have challenged the guiding principles that the CCP would seek to promote, with alternative value systems carried by increasing affluence, consumerism, improvements to education, and foreign culture.⁷⁴ In response, the CCP has had to change the nature of social control and thought work to coincide with a changing society which increasingly has access to alternative perspectives and sources of information, beyond those provided by the party. The challenge for the CCP will be ensuring legitimacy, or perceived legitimacy, in the minds of Chinese, and shaping government officials that will fulfil this role. As the eminent sociologist Max Weber wrote;

“every...system [of domination] attempts to establish and to cultivate the belief in its legitimacy. But according to the kind of legitimacy which is claimed, the type of obedience, the kind of administrative staff developed to guarantee it, and the mode of exercising authority, will all differ fundamentally.”

Source: Weber, Max. Economy and Society: An Outline of Interpretive Sociology. Berkeley. University of California Press, 1978. 213.

The nature of social control in China differs from other contemporary and historical authoritarian regimes, both in the means and the objectives. While the central goal remains to ensure the continued life of the CCP, this must be carried out alongside progressive reforms to the political, economic, social, and cultural spheres. As the needs of the party-state change, so do the needs for social control.

Party legitimacy was described during Interview Two as constructed upon five “great pillars” of CCP power; “[1] *their careful constraint of what appears in the public space, careful control of what is published... And this is that whole role of censorship...* [2] *One is the management of problems at the appropriate level... that whole system of managing conflict as it bubbles up is the second one of these...* [3] *having a strong military in general, is obviously one...* [4] *The basic social contract that they made...You let us be in charge, don’t challenge us. Don’t challenge the Chinese Communist Party rule, and we will improve your lives...* [5] *the final one is this whole question of thought control within the party.. all of those pillars are very, very strong, but it’s one of the weakest...It’s the one where they’ve probably been the least successful.*”⁷⁵ This summarizes the current strategy for legitimizing CCP rule; control what the media says to provide a favourable spin, manage national crises and social unrest, possess a strong military (just in case), continue to improve the economy and social welfare, and ensure the right perspectives via thought work. As the first four are relatively strong, the fifth needs to be reformed. The mechanisms of social control need to be enhanced in order to cultivate the desired public opinion.

Dr. Lam describes the evolution of the CCP and the maintenance of control as likened to seeking a “Mandate of Heaven”. In reference to the Dynasties period of ancient China whereby the Mandate of Heaven was the philosophical underpinning which defined a ruler or dynasty as legitimate, a concept of Divine Right. Heaven would bless just rulers with continued reign, or would likewise revoke the title in order to usher-in new leaders when the incumbent were found lacking, similar to the concept of the

“Divine Right of Kings” found in Europe in the early 17th Century. If the CCP is to have perennial rule, or perpetual rule, then it must “locate” the expectations of legitimacy in the needs and aspirations of the country while sustaining the levels of growth experienced in the last thirty years, thereby renewing the unspoken contract that binds Chinese people to the Chinese Communist Party.

Increasing modernization and globalized interaction with the world community may indeed require *more* propaganda and intensified thought work to support the CCO rule, thanks to rising access to the internet for example. The sources compete for the moral and physical support of the masses (although perhaps not explicitly), due to which, the CCP may require more social control in order to ensure the pre-eminent support for *their* perspectives and objectives.⁷⁶

Mass disenchantment with Communism and declining support for a Communist party is a potentially serious problem within China. The peasant and working classes predominantly have missed the benefits that have followed in the wake of economic growth. The end of ensuring egalitarianism represents a serious contradiction of what a Communist party should stand for. Since economic reform, social unrest has dramatically increased, but can no longer be maintained by violent-repression, for example the crackdown in Tiananmen, June 4th. The Chinese Ministry of Public Security (MPS) labels this unrest as “mass group incidents”, which ranges from petitions, marches, rallies, labour strikes, merchant strikes, student demonstrations, ethnic unrest, armed fighting, and riots.⁷⁷ Statistics show that from 1993 through 1999, civil unrest, or mass group incidents, increased 268% (from 8,700 to 32,000) at an annual rate of no less than 9% per year.⁷⁸ Much of the rise in social unrest is linked to the large disparity between the socio-economic classes, precisely one of the problems which fourth-generation leaders seek to resolve. Social control is necessary to curtail further increases in social unrest, or at least pacify certain sectors until demands can be met and improvements achieved.

Mechanisms of propaganda and thought work can no longer serve purely as a “mouth of the CCP”; the increasing availability of information technologies is gradually stimulating an awareness of current events, both domestic and international. It is no longer realistic to assume that the masses will accept whatever they are told as truth, similarly, ideology is no longer a sufficient motivator for support of party rule (both for the masses and party members alike). During the Mao era, propaganda and thought work had a negative focus, seeking to achieve a Communist utopia with violent agitation as means of persuasion, justified by class-struggle and revolutionary reform. The methodology was to ideologically reform the masses to the Marxist-Leninist values of egalitarianism and to eliminate bourgeoisie elements utilizing ideological purges, humiliation of ideological enemies, rigorous political study, and the elimination of ideological enemies.⁷⁹ The CCP has since discarded these saturation-style propaganda campaigns in exchange for a public relations role using a combination of reason, persuasion, praise, and criticism; also by promoting discussion, and appealing to emotion, the party now incorporates a Westernized approach to social control.⁸⁰

The objective of this alternative approach to social control is to “manufacture consent” for the CCP. The public relations role is well suited for damage control of contentious scenarios as the party can “spin doctor” information into an interpretation which better serves its interests. It further serves the party to have an awareness of the public opinion, both to better understand the expectations of the masses but also to defuse social crisis. As the sociologist Dr. Robert Jackall describes it “*public relations serves many different functions, some of them overlapping. Among the most important are: the systematic promoting of institutional goals, products, images, and ideologies,*” with the understanding that public relations, “social reality and reputations are not given but made.”⁸¹ In the case of the CCP, this is the generation of consent.

Additionally, if the party is to continue transition away from being a revolutionary force, then communication between the party and the masses needs to be reciprocal in order to work with the existing sentiment of the masses. Persuasion, as opposed to the use of force, helps to ensure long-term control and is necessary to manage a modernizing society and generate popular consent for the status quo of the Chinese one-party state.

Thought work and social control has also been of internal importance to the CCP. This serves the objective of shaping good behaviour in party members and government cadres with the “right thinking”: by promoting an understanding of the current party-line, minimizing factionalism, reinforcing the vanguard duty to the people as incentive for membership and good governance (rather than monetary incentives), and eliminating deviant behaviour (such as corruption and nepotism). Through ideological study, the party school system, rectification campaigns, and the top-down authority of the party elite through democratic centralism, the quality of party and state cadres can be improved. Genuine belief in the “socialist path” has been undermined since economic reform but the correct application of thought work can minimize the harmful effects that may arise parallel to disillusion.

Conclusion

The changes to the party and its’ guiding ideologies are directly connected to the modernization and development of China. Evolution of the party-state has been complementary to the evolution of China’s economy and society. Ideological reform has “permitted” economic liberalization and “opening-up”, while the emerging characteristics as a political party-in-power reflect the changes in society. To ensure the continued rule of the CCP, social control is needed for both the cadres and the masses alike.

The major ideological reforms that have been instituted under each succession in leadership since Mao present conflicting messages in how (the original goal of) socialist transformation should be

achieved. It is increasingly difficult for state and party cadres to be motivated singularly by the party-line. As economic reform leads to increasing opportunities for wealth, the CCP will be challenged by how to “create” party members that are both loyal to the people and their needs while adhering to ideological motivations. The theory of the Scientific Development Concept contains numerous policy prescriptions to alleviate the gulf between rich and poor, coastal and interior Chinese – disparities which fuel social unrest. Party and state cadres who can fulfil the peoples’ expectations as dutiful and considerate officials and whose job it is to serve the masses, may be an integral part to maintaining legitimacy in CCP rule.

These changes in society and the relationship between the masses and the party-state have altered the need for social control and the expectations of society have changed *how* the mechanisms of social control can be applied. In seeking to achieve rule by popular consent, the party has shed the means of social control used by the previous generations of party leadership, no longer attempting to promote revolutionary social transformation using violence and intimidation. While ensuring perennial rule and belief in party legitimacy remains the central objective of social control, a society geared towards class struggle and persistent-revolution would harm the progress towards realizing a modern China and would fracture social cohesion (as class distinctions between rich and poor have surfaced once more). In contemporary China, the party needs a stable society which identifies the CCP as vital to their livelihood and continued developmental progress. Social control, or rather social persuasion will help reinforce the idea that the CCP is necessary.

The following Chapter, Controlling the People’s Republic of China, will present specific examples of how the mechanisms of social control operate within China.

This Chapter seeks to explain the institutions in place to administer social control (specifically the institutions of thought work and propaganda), the groups commonly targeted for social control (or specifically the groups that *require* social control in the eyes of the CCP), and the means by which social control is achieved. With this information, the infrastructure in place for large-scale social control and the “tactics” used, one might better understand how successful the CCP has been thus far.

Institutions of Thought Work and Propaganda

The *Xuānchuán xìtǒng* (宣传系统), or “supra-bureaucracy of thought work and propaganda”, is organizationally similar to other Chinese party/state bureaucracies. At the apex of the organizational structure is a senior leader, drawn from CCP elite, to preside over the sectors of domestic and foreign thought work and propaganda. Each sector contains a leading group responsible for the management, coordination, and improvement of the various thought work and propaganda departments.⁸² These leading groups are composed of leading cadres in the party-state propaganda system. The following rung of the thought work and propaganda system is the CCP Politburo Standing Committee, followed by the CCP Central Committee Secretariat. The Secretariat’s task is to coordinate the different organs within the *xìtǒng*, ensuring a cohesive operation amongst the varied organizations and fields in which thought work has a role. This role is similar in function to the Politburo secretariat mentioned in Chapter 2, ensuring that policies regarding thought work, propaganda, and censorship are implemented accordingly. The Central Propaganda Department (CPD) plays a guiding role over the entire propaganda system, while serving as an administrative body of the Central Propaganda and Thought Work Leading group in charge of ideology-related work in the different sectors of society (third tier, see Fig 5.1).⁸³ Reflecting the modified role of thought work and propaganda in recent years, and now aligning towards

a public relations role, as mentioned in Chapter 3 and 4, the CPD is gradually distancing itself from some of the negative connotations that thought work and propaganda implied in previous eras. For example, the Chinese word for the “*xuānchuán*” (宣传) is increasingly translated into foreign languages as “public relations” rather than “propaganda”.

In order to disseminate the requisite information throughout all of China while at the same time ensuring that undesired information and perspectives are censored, the system for the transmission of thought work and propaganda is comprised of four smaller network-parts. Each of these networks engages the masses in different “settings”, depending on where individuals participate in Chinese society. The first network-part consists of the propaganda cadres and offices found throughout the party and state bureaucracy. As mentioned elsewhere, this marks an attempt to promote party theory. Second, is the network operated through the political department system of the PLA with a semi-autonomous branch represented by the Propaganda Department of the General Political Office. The third is the network amongst the sectors of society that are state-run, including culture, media, education, science, technology, health, and sports. The fourth are mass organizations, such as (but not limited to) professional associations, workers unions, social groups, and NGOs. Combined, these different networks provide the means for linking the influence of the *Xuānchuán xìtǒng* to all realms of society.⁸⁴

With equivalent branches at the provincial, city, and district levels, the central-objective of the CPD is to ensure that China’s ideological development is in accordance with the direction set by the CCP; as a result, the party-line should extend to Chinese society. The work of the CPD is separated into three principal tasks: overseeing ideological work, and all matters related to ideological work; policy-formulation to coordinate CCP strategy amongst different government institutions (so that the strategy has ideological support or that conflicting ideas can be censored or spin-doctored); and managing the

appointment of key-positions throughout propaganda, culture, and education cadres.⁸⁵ This last aspect, otherwise known as *nomenklatura*, grants extended influence over other organizations linked to the CPD (first and second tier, see Fig 5.1).

Equally as important to what is being transmitted in China is what is not being transmitted, referring to the use of censorship as a mechanism of social control. It is much easier to generate popular consent amongst a population largely ignorant to domestic or international conditions. To maintain control over the flow of information requires a comprehensive system for simultaneously monitoring information, transmitting information deemed acceptable, censoring information deemed unacceptable, and at the same time remaining up-to-date with changing technology. This is accomplished through coordination of three principal elements: (1) media tracking and management carried out by the CPD, the General Administration of Press and Publication (GAPP), and subordinate agencies; (2) promotion of thought work; and (3) laws and administrative regulations. While laws themselves represent a mechanism of social control, the codification of laws that permit censorship and media control empowers institutions of social control. For example, in 1992, the “Regulation on Guarding Secrets in News Publishing” was issued. Summarized by former propaganda department cadre, He Qinglian, of the municipal Communist Party Committee in Shenzhen, four major principles are contained which provide control over news media:

“(1) News organizations are responsible for monitoring their compliance with secrecy regulations and for submitting news reports to the relevant higher authorities for examination and approval... (2) News involving state secrets may only be communicated via internal channels... (3) Journalists must obtain prior approval to conduct interviews for stories involving “state secrets.”... (4) The system under which authorities issue news is laid out in the Regulation on Guarding Secrets in News Publishing. It stipulates that, to prevent the spreading of rumours, the central state organs and local government agencies must release information to news organizations in accordance with “propaganda specifications”...”


Source: He, Qinglian. The Fog of Censorship: Media Control in China. Trans. Paul Frank. New York: Human Rights in China, 2008. Human Rights Watch in China. 19 Aug. 2008. 07 Mar. 2009 <www.hrichina.org>. 53-55.

Through these regulations, journalists and other news media employees are subject to serious punishment on charges of divulging state secrets. Of course, these “state secrets” fall under an extremely broad category, in an attempt to intimidate any individuals who might break with state measures of social control. For example, Article 4 of the “Implementation Measures for the Law on the Protection of State Secrets” that any of the following conditions would represent a breach in state security:

- 1. If it jeopardizes the ability of the national government to maintain stability and defend itself;*
- 2. If it affects the integrity of the nation’s unity, the unity of its peoples, or its social stability;*
- 3. If it harms political or economic interests of the nation with respect to other nations;*
- 4. If it affects the safety of any national leader or foreign dignitary;*
- 5. If it hinders important national safety or public health work;*
- 6. If it causes a reduction in the effectiveness or reliability of any measures to protect state secrets;*
- 7. If it weakens the nation’s economy or technological strength;*
- 8. If it causes any national organ to lose its ability to exercise its legal authority.*

Source: 中华人民共和国保守国家秘密法实施办法 *Zhonghua renmin gongheguo baoshou guojia mimifa shishi banfa* (Implementation Measures for the Law of the People’s Republic of China on the Protection of State Secrets), May 1990, in Li Zhidong et al., *中华人名共和国保密法全书 Zhonghua renmin gongheguo baomifa quanshu*.

Figure 5.1: China's Domestic Propaganda System



The third tier of this consists of the sectors of Chinese society which are regarded as being engaged in propaganda and thought work.

Target Groups

While social control is extended towards the Chinese population in-general, thought work and propaganda *en masse* may not be effective to socialize stability and support for the CCP amongst those groups with special interests or backgrounds. As such, it is important for social control to be distinctively administered with specific “target groups” in order to accommodate the varying needs, desires and expectations in Chinese society.

Young Chinese students have long been an important group to receive targeted thought work and propaganda, especially considering the role students played as both Red Guard members during the Cultural Revolution between 1966 and 1976, and in the pro-Democracy movement leading up to the events of June 4th 1989. Throughout formal educational in China, students are encouraged to join Communist youth-groups to pursue further studies of party ideology, whether explicitly recognized as thought work or not. For example, Interviewee One had been a member of such groups since primary school, leading up to becoming a member of the CCP at age 18. At a young age, the ideology was unimportant; conditioning a favourable opinion was useful enough. *“It [propaganda] is everywhere in our life, reminding us of how good our party is, and how good of a life we have living under the leadership of the party. We love our party, because we don’t know the deep meaning of this party, because we’re too young,”*⁸⁶ These groups have served as important resources for identifying potential leaders amongst younger generations. The Communist Youth League (CYL) itself has produced key-figures amongst the party elite; Premier Wen Jiabao and President Hu Jintao being two examples.⁸⁷

For some groups, specific considerations are linked to the risk of future problems (whether immediate or long-term) that may unfold if these groups are left dissatisfied. Disenfranchised peasants

and workers, specifically the rural poor, compose an important and obviously large group. The problems linked to the disparities created after economic reform requires meaningful consideration. Not only have these individuals received increased attention within the paradigm of Hu's Socialist Harmonious Society, but additional measures are needed to maintain stability until conditions can be improved. For example, local-level elections serve as a means for venting frustration. Additionally, campaigns to promote Chinese nationalism can provide a sense of cultural empowerment, regardless of relative affluence or poverty. This concept will be explained in detail in the next section.

Some groups may exist largely outside mainstream Chinese society, because of this, routine mechanisms for social control of the masses may never "reach" these individuals. Some groups may not even consider themselves to be Chinese or a part of China whatsoever. Additional social controls are utilized in order to merge the collective interests of these groups with the rest of China's or to socialize a common national identity amongst those who don't perceive themselves as "Chinese" (whether bearing the distinction of ethnicity or nationality). This is the case with some religious groups and ethnic minorities, as they may lack social identification with China's predominantly secular, ethnic-Han majority. Two important groups are the ethnic-Tibetans in the Tibet Autonomous Region (also known as the "Xizang" Autonomous Region, the Mandarin name for Tibet) and the Uyghur people in the Xinjiang Autonomous Region. Both of these groups have expressed the common sentiment of separating from the PRC; the response of the CCP has been to provide "special" attention in an attempt to prevent social unrest. The title of "Autonomous Region" is itself an attempt to symbolize independent governance of each region in the eyes of residents.

In a recent attempt to socialize Tibet, on January 19th 2009, the Standing Committee of the Tibetan Autonomous Regional People's Congress endorsed a bill to designate March 28th as the annual "Serfs Emancipation Day".⁸⁸ The event is to mark the 50th anniversary of when the CCP dissolved the

traditional theocratic-monarchy of Tibet for the purpose of installing the authority of the Chinese state. Surrounding this event, education programs were bolstered in order to promote the past 50 years of Sino-Tibetan relations as altruistic and liberating⁸⁹, rather than typified by cultural genocide and long-term occupation. While oppressive violence has been used in past responses to Tibetan unrest, this example presents the alternative strategy of trying to socialize the CCP-interpretation of history while inundating Tibetans to the progress made under Chinese rule.

The means used for social control in Xinjiang have similarities with those applied in neighbouring Tibet. Although, on August 4th 2008, after an attack against a police station killed 16 officers, allegedly on behalf of Xinjiang-separatists⁹⁰, counter-measures were increased in order to prevent similar violence and unrest. The population of Xinjiang is composed predominantly of Uyghur, who are Turkic-Muslims. In fear that the holy month of Ramadan might incite anti-Chinese sentiment, the CCP imposed laws against the traditional Muslim observations during this sacred event.⁹¹ Likewise, party and state officials were banned from attending any related events or worship.⁹² These means of social control are somewhat heavy-handed compared to the public relations model discussed elsewhere, but represent a precautionary measure on behalf of the party to ensure stability in the region. Although, the social control directed at both the Tibetan and Uyghur groups may in fact be reinforcing conflicts of minority-mainstream social identity.

During our interview, Cardinal Zen expressed his frustration with how the government controls Chinese Catholicism, which he experienced while teaching at a Chinese Seminary school. In normal circumstances, outside of social control, the board of directors in Seminaries are composed of Bishops, Priests and Catholic faithful. In China, the Seminary board of directors are composed of half Bishops and half are government officials, justified by the CCP as giving proper direction to an otherwise unguided religion. Evidently, similar controls exist throughout the Chinese Diocese, with Bishops being appointed

by the party through a state-run group, the Chinese Catholic Patriotic Association, rather than the Holy See and the authority of the Vatican in Rome.⁹³

State and party cadres are also subject to control mechanisms. The actions and opinions found in these cadres reflect directly upon the CCP and the PRC. The use of rectification campaigns, the party school system, supervision by the CCDI, and ideological study sessions all serve to maintain a coherent and organized network of cadres, which is especially important amidst disillusion with Marxist-Leninist motivations. To provide an example of declining ideological appeal, a 1999 survey of party members in Sichuan province offered insight into the local cadres disenchantment with party ideology. Of the 11,586 party members surveyed, 61 percent felt that local officials did not devote their time to ideological study because of the workload involved, while about two thirds thought that local officials lacked appropriate “political perception” and “political judgement”. On the question of whether local officials placed “national interest” as their first priority, only 16 percent felt this was true, while 44 percent felt thought that “local leaders lacked self discipline.”⁹⁴ To encourage ideological thought work, all-expense paid “Red Study Tours” to sites with revolutionary importance and appropriate overseas locations have provided incentive for party loyalty while also serving to improve the understanding of party ideologies.⁹⁵

The PLA not only ensures the defence of China’s borders, but also safeguards the interests of the CCP as an armed force in service to the party (not the state), witnessed during their role in the Tiananmen crackdown.⁹⁶ As indicated by the importance of possessing the title “Chairman of the Central Military Commission”, the PLA itself is an influential power bloc within Chinese politics, holding a reasonable share of seats on the CCP Central Committee.⁹⁷ As a result, it is in the interests of the CCP to keep the military satisfied and under rein of social control. Thought work and propaganda serves to improve ideological indoctrination, political loyalty, and morale.

The Mechanisms of Social Control

Mechanisms of social control permeate throughout Chinese society, and while some elements may subtly guide individuals with implicit meanings, other elements are more obvious and explicit. For example, a more subtle approach to generating popular consent for CCP would be the use of nationalism. The promotion of nationalistic fervour or national success, international sporting events for instance, may not be the outright promotion of a CCP accomplishment, but may contain favourable implications towards the party, as a facilitator for national success. An example of an explicit approach to social control might be the use of ideological study-groups. Whether used in conjunction with the education of younger generations or even for cadres, these serve to indoctrinate participants towards the party-line, helping to legitimize ideological support for their rule.

The CCP utilizes extensive means for social control, not limiting itself to any singular implicit, explicit, proactive, or reactive strategy. When coordinated, these mechanisms have significant influences on individual morals, beliefs, sense of identity, and interpretation of the world around them. By possessing significant control over the different channels of information access and distribution while exerting influence on the social development of the society; the “presence” of the CCP can be identified throughout society. The effectiveness of CCP control can be largely attributed to recognizing emerging trends and adapting their mechanisms accordingly; for example, exerting control over the internet.

Mass media has long been a forum for broadcasting the desired ideological and political messages, used by Western democracies just the same as Eastern authoritarians.⁹⁸ Since the Mao era, mass media has served as an important “mouth-piece” for the party, and now, following economic reform and modernization, this role has continued, albeit with some modifications. Staple media sources of the CCP, such as the *People’s Daily*, China Central Television (CCTV), Xinhua News, and China

National Radio remain in consistent use, but have had to modernize alongside the rest of the country. Entertainment media serves as an important vehicle for political messages and social conditioning. When the vehicle (or perhaps as a “carrier”) is more popular, then the transmission will be seen/read/heard by a greater audience and with more enthusiasm.⁹⁹ Commercialization has directly supported entertainment media as a vehicle for propaganda and social control, although on the surface it appears less nefarious than the saturation-style used by previous generations of leaders. When interviewed, Dr. Lam refers to the media forum as a “battleground”, a fight for the media space. These fights occur in order to “win” space/time for providing the news and patriotic propaganda while constantly ensuring the marginalization of dissenting intellectuals.¹⁰⁰

Following modernization, China is increasingly becoming a pluralistic society with a diversified culture and lifestyle. In response, mass media needs to be more responsive to emerging audience demands, not only to capture their attention, but also to capture the revenue stream. With increasing pluralisation amongst Chinese citizens, there must be increased pluralisation amongst the various media venues, providing a greater number of choices (and increased variation of messages to consume).¹⁰¹ Privatization following economic reform has forced Chinese mass media to adopt advertising as a revenue source. Advertising as a revenue requires media to consider the interests and needs of the masses, rather as solely a voice for party messages. While the mass media is still under strict control of the CCP, propaganda must be carried alongside topics which interest Chinese people.

An important example of how mechanisms of social control have evolved alongside technology is evidenced in the case of the internet. Given the sheer volume of information available through the internet as a means of instantaneous transnational communication, it is important to enforce mechanisms of control over the internet. Since 1995, the internet has been available for public use, which according to the China Internet Network Information Centre (CNNIC) extends to 298 million

internet users as of December 31st 2006 (still only represents roughly 23 percent of China's population).¹⁰² To ensure control over the internet, the CCP continuously developed means of monitoring and censoring web traffic (both the search content and the individual). For example, in 1996, to censor websites originating within China, the GAPP issued the "1996 Provisional Regulation on the Administration of Electronic Publications", requiring registration of all websites to Chinese authorities.¹⁰³ Again, in August 2002, in order to control website content, the Provisional Regulations on the Administration of Internet Publications was issued by the CCP in August 2002.¹⁰⁴ It stipulates (as summarized once more by He Qinglian) key provisions to ensure that Chinese web-content falls under CCP approval:

- 1. Anyone who wishes to engage in Internet publishing activities must first obtain official approval. No unlicensed organization or individual may engage in Internet publishing activities.*
- 2. In addition to complying with the provisions of the Measures for the Administration of Internet Information Services, anyone running an Internet publishing business is required to have: a definite scope of publication; articles of association in compliance with laws and regulations; a professional editorial board and editorial staff; and sufficient funds, technical equipment, and offices appropriate for a publishing business [conditions beyond the reach of most individuals].*
- 3. Pursuant to record-keeping regulations, Internet publishers shall report to GAPP all instances of topics involving national security or social unrest.*
- 4. Forbidden content for Internet publications includes anything that propagates heretical cults or superstitions, contravenes the PRC constitution, endangers national unity, or involves state secrets or state security.*
- 5. Internet publications targeted at minors may not include content that induces them to imitate illegal behaviour or acts that violate social morals, or that is terrifying or cruel and impairs their physical or mental health.*
- 6. Publications may not include content specifically forbidden by laws and regulations.*
- 7. Internet publishers shall adopt a system of editorial responsibility whereby special editorial staff review for compliance with the law all content submitted for publication on the Internet."*

Source: He, Qinglian. The Fog of Censorship: Media Control in China. Trans. Paul Frank. New York: Human Rights in China, 2008. Human Rights Watch in China. 19 Aug. 2008. 07 Mar. 2009 <www.hrichina.org>. 169-170.

For websites that originate outside of China, censorship was more complicated. This required foreign companies to assist in the construction of the *Jīndùn* Project (金盾), in English, the “Golden Shield”, although commonly referred to in Western circles as China’s “Great Firewall”. The project sought to introduce a filtering system for a national intranet while incorporating a high-tech surveillance and control system of individual electronic devices.¹⁰⁵ By directing all of China’s major networks through different “gateways”, the CCP can manipulate the incoming information, and is capable of blocking information at a moments notice. For example, when a video was posted on YouTube.com showing police beatings of Tibetans during the protests of March 2008 (although the date of the footage cannot be confirmed), the website was immediately censored.¹⁰⁶ Of course, even this measure is not necessarily required, as major companies have cooperated with the CCP in order to assure market access to China. For example, the search engine Google.com self-censors their provided search content in China to ensure continued access to Chinese users.¹⁰⁷ As well, communication platforms are kept under control, maintaining state control over the means of communication. For example, the online mass communication/chat software Skype is operated in China through a filtering system to determine when users are discussing “sensitive” information, while blocking the content entirely when required.¹⁰⁸ Through maintaining a monopolistic control over the flow of information and communication, the CCP can “set the bar” of awareness amongst citizens, while limiting their ability to coordinate amongst themselves.

Telecommunications within China are under similar control mechanisms, as the telecom service sector is predominantly made up of state-owned or state-affiliated enterprises. Not only do these monopolies serve as an important revenue source, but permits control over the vital networks that

facilitate national coordination and logistics. Reform of the telecom sector would likely meet with firm resistance from conservative party members. Not only could this be opposed based on national security concerns, but as a SOE network, the telecom industry employs a large number of Chinese citizens.¹⁰⁹ Liberalization would relinquish a valuable means of control while also opening up opportunities of social unrest amongst the newly unemployed.

The education system has been a mechanism for social control amongst both citizens and party members alike. Conditioning individuals at a young age to view the CCP as a benevolent and just government increases the chance that these same individuals will continue to approve party-rule during later stages in life. Early influence is exerted via the Communist youth groups incorporated through school programs, as witnessed by the interviewed party-member.¹¹⁰ Akin to this are the re-education campaigns and party school systems mentioned in Chapter 2. While these serve to improve the overall quality of party and state cadres, the continued education serves to model social awareness amongst cadres with relatively homogenous understanding (through thought work) of the respective party line. For example, during campaigns to promote the understanding of the Three Represents Theory, overcoming conservatism amongst cadres was required in order to modernize the party. Instruction and thought work became a means of social engineering an end to the sentiments of revolutionary class-struggle.¹¹¹

For party and state cadres which fail to adopt the new thinking of successive generational leaders, rectification campaigns serve to remove unfit cadres while making room for new talent.¹¹² This serves the party in two less-than-obvious ways. Firstly, by removing unfit cadres, the governing capacity of local cadres can be improved, ideally removing redundant employees. Technically, this should improve the welfare of the respective citizens under local-cadres, if the cadre had otherwise been “doing his job” then rectification would have been unnecessary. Improving the governing capacity of

local cadres thereby has the secondary consequence of improving the CCP image at local levels. This was a key idea behind the 2005 “Party’s Governing Capacity”¹¹³ program described in Chapter 2. Secondly, rectification campaigns can serve to eliminate factional rivals. Using the CCDI and corruption charges as a tool of consolidating power further improves the hegemonic position of the respective paramount leader, ensuring better control over the CCP as a whole. The removal of lacking cadres can also be contrasted with the exaltation of “model” cadres and workers. Individuals who possess traits or have committed deeds matching the current party-line are advertised as pseudo-socialist archetypes, national figures to be emulated by citizens and cadres. During interview, the party member mentioned that model figures were a regular component of CCP influence during primary school.¹¹⁴

As discussed in previous chapters, CCP-ideology no longer stimulates the same appeal amongst the general population as during former generations. Besides the obvious contradictions between Marxism and modern economic reform, the party needs alternative means to “rouse the masses”. The use of nationalism and patriotism to galvanize Chinese support has filled gaps left by the decline in ideological appeal. Promotion of such sentiments can then be used by the CCP to improve their image or to channel public support. For example, the Sichuan earthquake provided an opportune spotlight for senior party leaders to be seen helping the victims, while also calling upon Chinese (including those abroad) to lend their support for reconstruction efforts and charitable donations.¹¹⁵ The interviewed party member expressed that while the Sichuan earthquake was definitely *not* a good thing, but that *“the Chinese government was successful in reminding the people how lucky we are to have this party that controls the country.”* *“It was a big opportunity for the Chinese people to build some faith in the government, because generally we have lost faith in them already.”*¹¹⁶

In lieu of Communist ideology, nationalism may be a more all-encompassing means of “uniting” China. As Dr. Lam commented, *“Most young people, even middle-age people are no longer interested in*

Marxism or Socialism. The propaganda of nationalism and patriotism is much easier to arouse their interests. Nationalism applies to a wider field."¹¹⁷ Unlike Communist ideologies in previous generations, nationalism offers no class distinctions; it carries popular appeal towards all Chinese citizens (or at least Han Chinese citizens). Of course, there are inherent risks in generating an excess of popular nationalism. In terms of securing foreign policy strategy, nationalism may result in a strict limitation and weakness for China. It has seriously complicated Chinese relations with Taiwan and Japan as well as creating difficulties with South Korea, Singapore and India, amongst other countries. This issue of nationalism is compounded by as an authoritarian government, contradictory to the democracies in which China should be seeking to develop bilateral relationships with.¹¹⁸ An example of this was seen in 2005 after the limited-publication of Japanese textbooks which overlooked many of the atrocities committed by Japanese Imperial Army during their occupation of China in World War 2. The resulting public outcry turned from peaceful protests into violent riots, with resident-Japanese and their business being attacked during the process. Consequently, the party reverted to using state media in order to downplay the nationalism and calm protestors, calling for "the building of a harmonious society".¹¹⁹ This example contrasts the different strategies of social control mechanisms, once nationalism was no longer under party the party reins, propaganda served to restore order.

Conclusion

As this Chapter has shown, the mechanisms for social control are numerous and varied, each serving to target different groups of individuals at key social intersections. Regardless of age, occupation, affiliation to the party, or relative affluence, the mechanisms of social control operate throughout Chinese society in order to benefit the CCP. Because of the gradual decline in belief for Communist ideology, the CCP needs to depend on alternative means to legitimize their continued rule. In turn, the social control mechanisms of propaganda and education are especially useful in promoting

the “new” legitimacy of the CCP, as a government that improves social welfare, provides the means for economic growth, and that facilitates national achievement and the glory of the Chinese people.

The next Chapter, “Prospects for the Future” will summarize the findings of this research in order to answer the three questions posed in the beginning of this thesis, which in turn serve to validate the original hypothesis.

From the previous Chapters, one might be able to understand how public opinion is shaped amongst Chinese society, and why it is important for the CCP to manage this development. Chapter 2 provides an understanding of the operational organization of the People's Republic of China and the Chinese Communist Party. With this information, one can better understand the foundation on which the CCP rests as an authoritarian government. Similarly, awareness of the issues faced by the PRC and CCP is important, as these issues implicate systemic problems for their cohesive functioning and for the society as a whole. In Chapter 3, the important evolutionary changes to the characteristics of the CCP are detailed. The shifts in party ideology have manifested throughout society, resulting in opening the economy to privatization and eliminating much of the rigid class distinctions that were characteristic of previous generations. This in turn has changed the nature of the party, how it is to interact with Chinese society and the expectations held by these citizens. Related to this, the CCP manages society and its changing need for and approach to social control. Chapter 4 lists the how social control operates, from the organs of state power to how this influences society. This includes the institutions that manage and regulate the social control mechanisms throughout society, the different social groups that require attention, and finally the different means utilized (the social control mechanisms themselves).

Armed with this knowledge, it is possible to answer the three questions posed during the introduction and thus validate the original hypothesis.

Questions Revisited

Returning to the questions posed in Chapter 1, as already stated, the research contained within this thesis serves to verify my hypothesis by determining the importance of social control, and in what

form and what settings social control mechanisms operate, and whether such control mechanisms are successful in achieving the party objective of popular consent and fostering public perceptions of legitimacy.

What are the specific mechanisms of social control currently in use?

Covered in detail in Chapter 5, “Controlling the People’s Republic of China”, the mechanisms of social control currently in use within China can be described as impressing upon society at the key social intersections. What this means is that social control mechanisms “fit” into the major spheres whereby “normal” or “routine” social interaction takes place. This is most likely because the alternating factors of routine social engagement are easier to predict; where it is taking place, when it will take place, between whom the social interaction occur, why it occurs, and how it will take place. With an awareness of these factors, prediction of how to implement social control mechanisms can take place. Mentioned in the previous Chapter, the classroom would be a prime example of a key social interaction, as the different factors that characterize social engagement in a classroom are relatively easy to predict. Although an exception to these spheres of social interaction may be any which are conducted in private or intimate settings. For example, it is difficult to implement social control mechanisms directly into how an individual might interact with his/her family. But to argue the same case, if the control mechanisms are sufficiently high and forceful upon an individual, it would shape how he/she treats family members.

All of the different social control mechanisms in use are complimentary. For example, propaganda may not have sufficient effect if it is not first accompanied by censorship; otherwise the available information to the public would be a cacophony; it would be impossible to predict *which* messages were received, the intended or the undesirable. The complimentary use of social control mechanisms assists in reinforcing objectives across the different spheres of social interaction so as to ensure that any value-content is sufficiently received. Also, complimentary use can serve to disguise

mechanisms of social control. If the intended effects of social control are taking place throughout society, then it becomes increasingly difficult to determine which aspects of social interaction are the product of concerted effort to shape society, and which are “normal” and uninfluenced. Take for example that there are three venues of social interaction A,B, C, and social control mechanisms are applied in A and B, but not C, then the relative uninfluenced social interaction in C might call into question those in A and B. For example, if an individual has been raised entirely within a society whose government implements social control mechanisms, their first time leaving may seem strange because of different “acceptable” social engagements. This may call into question the social process occurring in the home society, or may call into question the new society, somewhat similar to culture shock, depending on how effective the former social control measures were.

Propaganda is an important social control mechanism used to manipulate representations. This may be through altering information and then displaying the new information en masse, or it may simply repeat the same information over and over so as to indelibly imprint itself upon the consciousness of those it targets. In China, propaganda can come can be transmitted via mass media, literature, history, through education, art, and national or cultural events. Any space in which individuals are listening, reading, or watching is a potential forum for propaganda.

In these very same forums, the social control mechanism of censorship can operate in order to, in effect; remove what considered objectionable. This eliminates the competition between ideas and perspectives so that the only information received is that which adheres to the relative definition of right and wrong or serves the interest of those censoring. In China, this may take the same forms as propaganda, but may also include spheres of social interaction that propaganda might appear too overt or profane (religion for example).

Religion may fulfill two different roles when describing social control mechanisms. It may either serve as a social control mechanism (by establishing a dichotomy between right or wrong) or by creating definitions of the sacred and alternate social rituals. The other role that religion may occupy is as a resistance to social control mechanisms (secular controls, to be specific). Because the CCP is officially an atheistic organization, the alternate value systems presented by religion run contrary to its doctrine. In China, there is a range between acceptable and unacceptable religion. While some religious or spiritual beliefs may be relatively free, such as filial piety to ancestors; other may be circumspect to control, such as Catholicism and Islam; and still others may be forbidden outright, such as the Falun Gong.

Control over the means of communication can facilitate greater control over mechanisms of social control, if not a mechanism outright. As already mentioned, much of the different means of mass communication are owned and regulated by the state or are under the state's supervision. This can serve to assist in the implementation of censorship, but can also limit the means of organized dissent. By maintaining a monopoly over how people communicate, control is granted over social interaction at distance.

Thought Work no longer has the degree of social control over society as a whole, at least not as intensely as for those inside the party and state infrastructure. Speaking with Dr. Lam and other young Chinese students, study sessions of party ideology no longer inspire the same reverence as they did in previous generations. The decline in Marxist appeal has weakened the effect of rigorous ideological indoctrination. Although for party cadres, a "correct" understanding of guiding party ideology may have substantial bearing on their political careers.

The process of education and the institutions of education are influential spheres to impart social control mechanisms. As a process, especially when initiated at a young age, education containing social control mechanisms can have long-lasting effects on socializing the desired standards, values, and

perspectives with which to interpret the social environment. One of the most basic characteristics of education is that it serves to impart knowledge; a “correct” education, as defined by the party, may act as a precursor to accepting future social control. Furthermore, as an institution, education serves as a forum to reaffirm social control mechanisms by setting social norms amongst student peer-groups.

Laws and the institution of law have similar effects on society as education, but perhaps with a greater degree of force than the aforementioned. Laws can be used to buttress social norms, connecting defined punishments and repercussions to social deviance. Acting in accordance of law can also be used to justify or condemn individual actions, defining them as legal or illegal. Because there is no degree of independence in the Chinese legal system, all laws are subject to the will of the party. Thus, laws serve the party interests, such as social control.

Allurement or threat; these terms describe the means by which social control are applied. With such expansive power over China, the CCP is posed to offer any benefit, advantage or reward to those who adhere to their control. Antithetical to this is the use of threat. For the same reasons that CCP can offer attraction, to defy the CCP risks negative consequences. This can be likened to the idiom of “the carrot or the stick”, each used to induce a desired behaviour. During interview, Dr. Lam and Cardinal Zen distinguished between these terms when describing social control mechanisms.¹²⁰ In conversation, Dr. Lam described that the attachment of risks to dissident action serves as a threat; through selective news articles, the CCP’s attitudes on what defines disobedience can be conveyed to society. Cardinal Zen compared allurement and threat to imposing a moral dilemma; by attaching these optional consequences to willingly accepting (or resisting) social control the CCP can influence individuals to act against their moral beliefs.

To summarize, the specific mechanisms of social control currently in use all share the common trait of engineering individuals, and society in general, towards an ideal model prescribed by the CCP.

Each mechanism engages along social intersections in order to modify interaction between individuals and the intake of information. The ideal model, or intended effect will be answered in the next question.

What are the effects on society when applying social control mechanisms?

To answer this question requires one to distinguish between the actual effects and the intended effects. Simply put, the consequences of social control may not overlap with the goals of social control. This may occur for a number of reasons. Unforeseen circumstances (natural or manmade) may alter social cohesion in a way that is extremely difficult, or simply *impossible* to predict. For example, the Asian financial crisis of 1997 had lasting consequences on societies in South Korea, China, Taiwan, Hong Kong, Thailand, Singapore, Malaysia and Indonesia. If anyone had foreseen the chain of events leading up to this recession, they certainly made no efforts towards a viable contingency plan. In seeking to modify a society, a degree of awareness and knowledge about the respective society should be requisite; the more information, the better. Wilful ignorance, incompetence, misinformation, or disdain can result in an undesired response from society. Informed decision-making allows for a greater accuracy in calculating the required speed, action/inaction, and the degree of “force” in such actions. Yet, actual consequences may indeed be better than expected, and not necessarily worse than intended. To summarize, there are many factors which may result in unintended effects on society when applying social control mechanisms.

Referring to Question 3, part of the objective in this thesis was to investigate ‘*Why is social control actively used by the CCP?*’ So therefore, the *intended* effects are more important in relation to the CCP’s motivations.

Primarily, social control mechanisms are utilized to promote the CCP’s influence and facilitate the meeting of its objectives. These may have micro-level or macro-level implications. For example, a micro-level objective may be to socialize obedience and harmony amongst an unsatisfied social group,

unemployed migrant workers for instance, although of course, migrant workers represent a very large number of individuals. Control over this group, either by temporarily satisfying them or conditioning them to accept their unfortunate social position would serve to stabilize the group, limiting the chances of social unrest and fragmentation. Social stability, as mentioned in my hypothesis, is complimentary to the macro-level objective that has been demonstrated throughout this thesis, seeking legitimacy in the area of public opinion. Without achieving legitimacy in the minds of the Chinese public, the continued rule of the Chinese Communist Party would be called into question.

In addition to promoting the CCP's influence, control over the spheres of social interaction can work against contentious ideas. This can be accomplished in different means. Dr. Lam and the CCP member interviewed both described how the "spaces" where ideas are formed such as mass media, academic institutions, social organizations, interest groups, and intellectual discourses are filled with CCP propaganda.¹²¹ This in turn marginalizes the availability of alternative perspectives. Another means of eliminating contentious ideas is to label them as opposed to the interests of the state, which renders dissidence illegal and punishable by law. Dr. Lam circumstantiated the effect of education on contemporary Chinese university students. The concept "*As far as politics is concerned, leave it to the party,*"¹²² has been well absorbed, the potential risks of engaging in dissident politics outweighs the intellectual or effectual gains. Furthermore, Dr. Lam argues that this removal of political interests from student consciousness as assisted by CCP promotions of patriotism and the societal influence that defines wealth as success; "*The party desperately needs some new cohesive core values to bind the nation together... Because instead, if they become attracted to Western culture, Western ideology, they may make trouble for the state.*"¹²³

The corollary to the effect of social control mechanisms on individuals and society as a whole is to constrict social awareness, ensuring that the CCP has predominant influence. Social control does not

necessarily imply an invisible hand that forces individuals to do one thing and not do something else. For the most part, Chinese citizens are free to determine their course in life, but many choices are limited to what the CCP determines to be “acceptable conduct”; for example, anti-CCP politics would be decidedly unacceptable. Related to denying these choices is the control over information; by ensuring censorship, the CCP can deny certain ideas from filtering into mainstream society, especially ideas that would undermine party legitimacy or lead to social/political unrest.

Why is social control actively used by the CCP?

Related to this question is an integral component of *why* the CCP feels that utilizing social control is *important*. This begs additional questions of what would be the alternative to using social control? What might happen in the absence of social control?

Firstly, an enlarged democratic process might serve as a viable alternative to social control. This would provide a means for individuals to instigate changes via a ballot box. This would achieve the objective of creating popular consent and popular legitimacy as party and state officials could be elected by citizens. Democratic process would also provide the means to vent frustration and thereby curb social unrest. If the respective government body failed to meet societal expectations; they would be replaced (ideally) by more capable candidates. In response to this, one might argue that China is not ready for democracy, at least not yet. In the current stage of development, democratization might seriously disturb national stability.¹²⁴ This would also require extensive cooperation from highest echelons of the party, to dismantle the CCP’s infrastructure would be a monumental undertaking without the party to actively lend support. It is unlikely that any Western model of democracy would be accepted by CCP leadership in the near future.

Secondly, in the absence of social control, China might risk systemic social collapse. This would probably not occur immediately, but without a means of ensuring relative cohesion amongst Chinese

society as a whole, a gulf between the different social and ethnic classes might emerge. There exist considerable differences amongst the different classes, regions, and ethnicities in China, and their needs and desires do not likely coincide with each other. Without a buffer to keep each group in order, there could be serious contention in satisfying the needs of everyone. As well, considering the rise in social unrest cited in Chapter 3, if this represents a long-term trend while *still under* social control mechanisms, disengaging social controls might permit unrest to escalate tremendously. As an authoritarian government attempting to cultivate positive public opinion that supports CCP rule, social control mechanisms are essential for the time being.

The senior diplomat from Interview Two gave the assessment that social control is used to influence party members in response to their declining appeal for Communist ideology after Deng Xiaoping's economic reform, a serious problem, mentioned in Chapter 3. Social controls are required in order to curb alternative value systems amongst party members, such as the drive to get rich: *"It's a major problem. It's the major problem that the Chinese Communist Party is well aware of... It's one of the reasons why they're still so sensitive about foreign interference or intervention of religion, there are all sorts of historical reasons for that as well, they realize that they have a problem. Maoism was a coherent, consistent take on the world. This open ended praxis that has come in the sweep of Deng and particularly at periods embracing the things that were an anathema before. It has real problems for them."*¹²⁵

Akin to the answer from Interview Two, Dr. Lam also equated social control as linked to the end of Communism's popular appeal within society; *"Communism is dead, the party needs legitimacy, and the society needs core values around which the people can rally amongst themselves, cohesive values to bind people together... Now there's none of these. The party desperately needs some cohesive core values to bind the nation together."*¹²⁶

Each of these ideas presents an aspect of the CCP reasoning in why to use social control mechanisms; to shape an ideal moral system of beliefs. Expressly, a moral system that coincides with the party's objective of continued rule. Examples such as Mencius-Confucianism are a clear example of what the party expects from its Chinese constituents: unwavering loyalty and support that does not challenge their continued authority.

In answering the question of "Why is social control actively used by the CCP?" A tautologous answer is that if social control was *not* important for CCP rule, or if it was inessential; then they would not invest such vast financial resources and manpower to maintain the system, such a commitment of concerted effort would not take place. Likewise, dissidence would not be punished so harshly if it were not the last resort in the CCP mindset. If the CCP is going to maintain this grip on power, it needs to contend with dissenting ideas, some domestic, and some foreign. Economic growth, improvements to social welfare, and national prestige are not exclusive products of a Communist party. Other political systems may provide the same benefits, perhaps even more efficiently. For this reason, the CCP needs to retain and consistently improve social control mechanisms.

Conclusions and Future Prospects

Before concluding, a few additional points should be detailed. Through my research into this topic, certain trends in CCP authority are apparent, potentially representing implications of the future relationship between the party and the people.

The importance of the military cannot be overlooked when examining the power of the CCP. Commented by the interviewed diplomat, this is a one of the great pillars of CCP power. When "peaceful" means of social control fail to achieve stability or when anti-CCP rhetoric escalates into large scale demonstrations, alternative measures to maintain order are readily available. Armed forces such

as the PAP and the PLA can be used to restore social order, but physical coercion and violent force (hard social controls) can only provide short-term solution, and may consequently invite further antipathy towards the CCP.¹²⁷ Although there is no other power base within China that is capable of challenging the CCP, if there were one to exist, it would have to contend with a military that exclusively serves the party. Mentioned in Chapter 4, such support requires certain control mechanisms to ensure loyalty on behalf of the PLA. In recent years, this has also been supplemented with an expanded military budget. It will be interesting to see whether President Hu Jintao abdicates the position as Chairman of the Central Military Commission last, such as former President Jiang Zemin. Regardless, the continued cooperation is likely to be an increasingly expensive relationship.

The use of nationalism as a replacement to mass ideology may offer certain opportunities for propping up legitimacy, but the use of nationalism also poses inherent risks for continued CCP rule. Nationalism can only be used in moderation because as an idea and as a source of legitimacy, it can be hijacked by dissident groups as a justification for challenging party rule. This requires a multi-polar concept of legitimacy to be developed by the party; nationalism cannot be the sole source. This is another reason why continued economic success and improvements to social welfare are equally important in securing perennial rule. As mentioned in Question 2, without achieving a broad sense of legitimacy in the minds of the Chinese public, the continued rule of the Chinese Communist Party would be called into question. Economic growth cannot be depended upon as the sole source of legitimacy either. If GDP were to significantly drop, then the measures of economic liberalization might be called into question, especially by the more conservative factions of the CCP.

As this research has shown, the mechanisms of social control engage society at key social intersections, each under the broad administration of the CCP Central Propaganda Department, the supra-bureaucracy responsible for coordination of propaganda and thought work. This is in order to

engineer society towards the CCP's ideal moral system, composed of concepts of right and wrong which serve party interests. By constricting social awareness through censorship and state-run education, the CCP can ensure that it has foremost influence over the social landscape. Social imprinting through measures of propaganda and thought alter the individual and societal interpretations of culture, nationalism, economics, and especially politics. While citizens of the People's Republic of China are predominantly free to make individual choices, the available selection is curtailed to what the CCP determines to be acceptable conduct, while at the same time systematically marginalizing ideas, opinions, and means of dissent. This is the nature of a vanguard party; the party does not represent the people, the party represents the people as they *ought* to be. The efficacious application of social control mechanisms results in a relatively cohesive society. Yet, Chinese citizens continue to desire improvements in their quality of life, national prestige, economic growth, modernization and government responsibility on behalf of the CCP. Meeting these expectations (while simultaneously maintaining social control) in turn generates popular consent for the one-party system and locates the legitimacy of the CCP. Thus, the ruling position of the Chinese Communist Party is consolidated, extending perennial rule.

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Notes to Chapter 4

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- Notes to Chapter 5
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- ¹²¹ During Int.1, the party member explained that because of CCP control over the media, their influence can extend "everywhere". During Int.3, Dr. Lam described the media as the "battleground" for promoting party rhetoric, ensuring that contradictory politics are kept out of the public sphere.
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